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Abstract
A large body of research has investigated whether physicians overuse care. There is less evidence 
on whether, for a fixed level of spending, doctors allocate resources to patients with the highest 
expected returns. We assess both sources of inefficiency exploiting variation in rates of negative 
imaging tests for pulmonary embolism. We document enormous across-doctor heterogeneity in 
testing conditional on patient population, which explains the negative relationship between 
physicians’ testing rates and test yields. Furthermore, doctors do not target testing to the highest 
risk patients, reducing test yields by one third. Our calibration suggests misallocation is more 
costly than overuse.
1 Introduction
Many have argued that current medical practice involves large amounts of wasteful 
spending, with little cross-sectional correlation between regional health spending and health 
outcomes (Wennberg et al. 1996). But determining the best approach to lower costs and 
improve quality depends critically on the nature of the inefficiency (Garber and Skinner 
2008): is the problem that physicians are spending to the “flat of the curve” where marginal 
*An earlier draft of this paper circulated under the title, “Negative Tests and the Efficiency of Medical Care: What Determines 
Heterogeneity in Imaging Behavior?” Thanks to Brian Abaluck, Joe Altonji, Joshua Aronson, David Chan, Judy Chevalier, Michael 
Dickstein, David Dranove, Amy Finkelstein, Howard Forman, Jonathan Gruber, Nathan Hendren, Vivian Ho, Mitch Hoffman, Lisa 
Kahn, Jon Kolstad, Amanda Kowalski, Danielle Li, Costas Meghir, David Molitor, Fiona Scott-Morton, Blair Parry, Michael Powell, 
Constana Esteves-Sorenson, Ashley Swanson, Bob Town, and Heidi Williams as well as seminar participants at AHEC 2012, AEA 
meeting 2013, Boston University, Cornell, HEC Montreal, IHEA 2013, the National Bureau of Economic Research, NIA Dartmouth 
research meeting, the National Tax Association annual meeting, Northwestern, Stanford, University of Houston, and Yale. Funding for 
this work was provided by NIA Grant Number T32-AG0000186 to the NBER.
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returns to treatment are low, or are physicians treating the wrong patients and achieving 
suboptimally low returns for a given amount of spending?
Diagnostic imaging has been a particularly salient target for policy intervention to prevent 
overuse. Use of imaging studies grew faster than any other physician service between 2000 
and 2007 (Iglehart 2009), leading to concerns about the costs and appropriateness of these 
imaging tests (Rao and Levin 2012). The Choosing Wisely campaign, sponsored by the 
American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation and other leading professional societies, 
encouraged reductions in use of 45 common tests and procedures in 2012, over half of which 
were diagnostic imaging services.
In this paper, we develop an econometric framework for evaluating how testing intensity and 
selection of patients impact yields of diagnostic imaging studies. To identify testing intensity 
(defined as the tendency to test any given patient), our framework decomposes variation in 
diagnostic imaging rates across doctors into heterogeneity in patients’ benefits from testing 
and heterogeneity in physicians’ tendency to test a given patient. Additionally, the model 
identifies whether physicians are weighting patient observable risk factors to maximize test 
yield (i.e. the number of positive tests for a given number of tests). Despite the widespread 
policy attention to the problem of overuse in imaging, our analysis finds that the welfare 
costs of misallocation are much larger than the costs of overuse. Our findings suggest that 
for a popular and common diagnostic test, physicians systematically fail to target imaging to 
those patients with the greatest risk of an acute, often fatal medical condition.
Our model builds on classical econometric selection models originally developed by 
Heckman (1979) and refined by Chandra and Staiger (2011). Adapting these models to study 
repeated test decisions by physicians, we argue that the test yield among each doctors’ 
marginally tested patients—those tested patients whom the doctor is nearly indifferent 
between testing and not testing—can be used to reveal the doctor’s testing intensity and 
provides exclusion restrictions useful for identifying whether doctors successfully maximize 
test yields.
The same modeling approach can be applied in any setting where we observe repeated 
choices by a decision-maker meeting two conditions: first, the decision-maker aims to 
maximize an observable outcome among selected individuals; second, the value of the 
relevant outcome is known under the counterfactual where selected individuals were not 
selected.1 In this case, we assume that physicians seek to maximize test yield for a given 
number of tests, and we know that test yield is zero if a patient is not tested (the condition 
will not be detected without this test). Other applications include banks deciding which 
customers to loan to at a given interest rate in order to maximize profits or employers 
deciding which employees to hire to maximize productivity. Banks earn zero profits from 
1We discuss the second condition at greater length in Section 4. In Abaluck, Agha, and Chan (2016), we extend the framework 
developed here to the case of two-sided selection also studied by Chandra and Staiger (2011). Specifically, we study the decision of 
whether to treat a patient with Warfarin to minimize strokes; unlike the case studied in this paper where knowing test yield fully 
reveals the impact of testing on the probability of a positive test (and given calibration assumptions, on the medical value of the test), 
knowing strokes only among treated patients does not suffice to recover treatment effects for those patients.
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customers who do not receive a loan and employers get no productivity benefits from 
employees who are not hired, so our second condition is satisfied.
We apply our model to analyze CT scans that test for pulmonary embolism (PE). Estimation 
of the model requires that we can observe test outcomes among patients selected for testing, 
as well as the structural assumption that doctors will order a CT scan to test for PE if the 
patient’s ex ante risk of PE exceeds a doctor-specific testing threshold. This threshold is our 
patient invariant measure of physician testing intensity and we seek to recover it for each 
doctor in our sample.
Identifying differences in physicians’ practice styles separately from patient heterogeneity 
typically requires either quasi-random assignment of patients to physicians or estimates of 
potentially heterogeneous causal effects of medical treatment for each patient. Prior 
research, including Chandra and Staiger (2011) and Currie and MacLeod (2013), has argued 
that reliable estimates of causal treatment effects can be obtained using detailed chart data to 
control for all patient characteristics observable to doctors, but such data is typically only 
available in limited samples. This stumbling block makes it difficult to investigate both the 
extent and the determinants of healthcare overuse or misuse.
A key insight of this paper is that the ex post value of a diagnostic test, in this case chest CT 
scans, is partially observable in insurance claims records based on whether the test results in 
the relevant diagnosis. A doctor who performs many negative CT scans, which have little ex 
post value for improving patient health, is likely to have a low testing threshold. Our model 
accounts for heterogeneity in patient PE risk and shows how to recover physicians’ testing 
thresholds. Using these estimated testing thresholds, we investigate the role of medical 
training, malpractice environment, hospital characteristics and regional factors in shaping 
practice styles. The model also allows investigation of whether doctors are misweighting 
observable patient risk factors in selecting which patients to test for PE. By comparing how 
observable risk factors predict physicians’ testing decisions to how those same variables 
predict rates of positive tests amongst tested patients, we can identify whether physicians are 
targeting CT scans to the patients with the highest risk of PE based on demographics and 
comorbid conditions.
Previous research has identified important differences in practice style and skill across 
physicians. Chandra and Staiger (2011) conclude that overuse of care explains a large 
amount of variation in treatment for heart attacks across hospitals. Currie and MacLeod 
(2013) uncover substantial heterogeneity in diagnostic skill across obstetricians. Finkelstein 
et al. (2014) find that roughly half of the variation in medical spending across regions is 
driven by provider behavior (rather than patient preferences or health risks), and Molitor 
(2012) reports that environmental factors explain much of the variation in physician’s rates 
of cardiac catheterization.
We extend this prior literature by not only estimating heterogeneity in physician practice 
styles, but also explicitly demonstrating that differences in practice style explain why 
physicians who use more medical resources have lower average medical returns to 
utilization. We then estimate the resulting welfare loss from the measured variation in 
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practice styles. We additionally investigate physicians’ systematic underweighting and 
overweighting of patient risk factors and assess how failure to target medical resources to the 
patients with the highest expected returns impacts health benefits and total welfare. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to do so in the health economics literature. This analysis 
highlights a policy-relevant mechanism by which physician decisions may influence health 
outcomes, and sheds light on the economic importance of these systematic errors in expert 
judgment.
We analyze 1.9 million emergency department visits drawn from a 20% sample of Medicare 
claims data, 2000–2009. We present reduced form evidence of a sharply negative 
relationship between physician testing rates and test yields: those physicians who test the 
most patients also have the lowest rate of positive tests. We apply a structural model to show 
that this pattern is explained by enormous heterogeneity in doctors’ testing thresholds. 
Doctors who test more patients move further down the net benefit curve and test patients 
who are less likely to test positive. Less experienced doctors and doctors in higher spending 
regions tend to have lower risk thresholds at which they deem CT imaging worthwhile.
Further, physicians fail to target the test to the highest risk patients. Recognized risk factors 
based on a patient’s medical history, some of which are included in popular PE risk scores, 
continue to receive too little weight in physicians’ testing decisions. On the other hand, 
symptoms appear to be overweighted in some cases. Physicians tend to overtest patients 
previously diagnosed with one of several conditions which have similar clinical symptoms to 
PE: rather than infer the patient is having a recurrent episode of their existing condition, the 
physician may order a PE CT despite the low predicted risk. Finally, black patients are tested 
less often than other patients despite their higher risk of PE.
Applying calibration assumptions about the cost of testing, the benefits of treating PE and 
the likelihood of false positives, we compare our estimated distribution of physician testing 
thresholds to the calibrated socially optimal threshold. This comparison tells us whether 
doctors are overtesting or undertesting from a social standpoint.2 Under our preferred 
calibration assumptions, 84% of doctors are overtesting in the sense that for their marginal 
tested patients,3 the costs of testing exceed the benefits. In a simulation where no doctors 
overtested, the net social benefits from chest CTs would increase by 60% and the number of 
chest CT scans would fall by 50%. The calibration also allows us to assess the degree of 
inefficiency from physician misweighting of patient risk factors. Weighting observable 
comorbidities to maximize test yields would increase the net benefits of testing by more than 
300%, primarily by leading to additional testing and appropriate diagnosis of patients with a 
PE.
2Earlier drafts of this paper called this an “allocative inefficiency”. In the framework of Garber and Skinner (2008), this is an 
allocative inefficiency in the sense that one has gone too far along the flat of the curve relating health outcomes to spending, meaning 
that the marginal return to an additional dollar of care is small (too many resources are allocated to this service). This is contrasted 
with a productive inefficiency in which one is on a lower production function than could feasibly be achieved. Confusingly, such a 
“productive inefficiency” may well result from misallocation of resources - for example, failing to allocate CT scans to those patients 
who benefit most. To avoid the resulting confusion, we now avoid the use of the terms “allocative inefficiency”” and “productive 
inefficiency” and only use the term “allocation” in the context of whether physicians are appropriately choosing which patients to test 
in order to maximize test yield.
3Throughout this paper, “marginal” patients is used to refer to those patients whom a given physician is indifferent between testing 
and not testing.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on chest CT scans 
for PE. Section 3 describes the data and uses reduced form evidence to motivate the 
structural model. Section 4 lays out our structural model of testing behavior and describes 
our estimation strategy. Section 5 reports results from estimating our structural model. 
Section 6 probes the robustness of these results to alternative modeling approaches that relax 
or vary key identifying assumptions. Section 7 conducts simulations to uncover the welfare 
implications of our findings, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Background on PE CTs
We study testing behavior in the context of chest CT scans performed in the emergency 
department to detect PE. PE is the third most common cause of death from cardiovascular 
disease, behind heart attack and stroke (Goldhaber and Bounameaux 2012), and CT scans 
are the primary tool for diagnosis of PE. Yet given the financial costs and medical risks of 
testing, PE CT scans are commonly thought to be overused in emergency care. The 
American College of Radiology targeted PE CT as a key part of the Choosing Wisely 
campaign aimed to reduce overuse of medical services. Despite the concern about overuse, 
the Office of the Surgeon General (2008) estimates that approximately half of PE cases are 
undiagnosed, based on analysis of autopsy reports. The simultaneous concern in the medical 
community about overuse and missed diagnoses raises the question of whether diagnostic 
testing for PE is currently being targeted to maximize PE detection.
A PE occurs when a substance, most commonly a blood clot that originates in a vein, travels 
through the bloodstream into an artery of the lung and blocks blood flow through the lung. It 
is a serious and relatively common condition, with an estimated 350,000 diagnosed cases of 
PE per year in the United States (Office of the Surgeon General 2008). Left untreated, the 
mortality rate from a PE depends on the severity and has been estimated to be 2.5% within 
three months for a small PE (Lessler et al. 2010), with most of the risk concentrated within 
the first hours after onset of symptoms (Rahimtoola and Bergin 2005). Accurate diagnosis of 
PE is necessary for appropriate follow-up treatment; even high risk patients are unlikely to 
be treated presumptively.
CT scans to test for PE have a number of attractive features for our purposes: they are a 
frequently performed test; they introduce significant health risks and financial costs; a 
positive test is almost always followed up with immediate treatment, observable in Medicare 
claims records; and a negative test provides little information to the physician about 
alternative diagnoses or potential treatments. We discuss each of these features in more 
detail in Appendix B, explaining how the clinical context supports our modeling 
assumptions.
PE is an acute event with a sudden onset. The symptoms of PE are both common and 
nonspecific: shortness of breath, chest pain, or bloody cough. Hence, there is a broad 
population of patients who may be considered for a PE evaluation. Practice guidelines 
recommend that physicians also consider several additional risk factors before determining 
whether to pursue a workup for PE.4
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Many argue that PE CT scans are widely overused (Coco and O’Gurek 2012, Mamlouk et al. 
2010 and Costantino et al. 2008). Recent estimates by Venkatesh et al. (2012) suggest that 
one third of CT scans in a sample of 11 US emergency departments would have been 
avoidable if physicians had followed National Quality Forum guidelines on CT usage. The 
nonspecific symptoms of PE and significant mortality risk likely both contribute to overuse, 
particularly in the emergency care setting.
A CT angiogram is the standard diagnostic tool for PE. The average allowed charge in the 
Medicare data is around $320 per PE CT when the bill is not covered by a capitation 
payment. Payment goes to the radiologist for interpreting the scan and to the hospital for the 
technician and capital equipment required to perform the scan. The emergency department 
doctor responsible for ordering the test has, at most, a diffuse incentive to ensure the 
hospital’s financial health and reduce his malpractice risk, but he receives no direct 
payments from Medicare or the hospital for ordering a scan.
PE CT scans also come with small but important medical risks. The most significant risk 
arises from false positive CT scans which lead to additional unnecessary treatment with 
anticoagulants, incurring financial costs and creating significant risk of bleeding. In addition, 
there is an estimated 0.02% chance of a severe reaction to the contrast, which then carries a 
10.5% risk of death (Lessler et al. 2010), although this cost is small relative to the billed 
financial costs of a CT scan. Finally radiation exposure may increase downstream cancer 
risk, although the additional lifetime cancer risk is minimal for the elderly Medicare 
population in this study.
The key simplifying assumption we make to evaluate the net benefits of testing is that a 
negative test has no value. This assumption is not true in general for all tests: a negative test 
may rule out one treatment thus justifying treatment for an alternative, or a negative test 
might prevent an otherwise costly treatment. However, in our setting—CT scans for PE—a 
positive test is followed by an inpatient admission and treatment with blood thinners while a 
negative test does not suggest any further interventions or testing for related problems. We 
defend this assumption at greater length in Appendix B.
3 Data
We combine data from five sources: Medicare claims records, the American Hospital 
Association annual survey, the American Medical Association Masterfile, the Medicare 
Physician Identification and the Eligibility Registry, and the Avraham Database of State Tort 
Law Reforms. Using a 20% sample of Medicare Part B claims from 2000 through 2009, we 
identify patients evaluated in an emergency department and observe whether they were 
tested for PE, as well as whether any such test succeeded in detecting PE.
4Popular practice guidelines use the following factors to calculate a risk score: age, elevated heart rate, recent immobilization or 
surgery, history of deep vein thrombosis or PE, recent treatment for cancer, coughing up blood, lower limb pain or swelling, and 
chances of an alternative diagnosis.
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3.1 Medicare claims data
We begin by identifying all patients evaluated in the emergency department (ED), using 
physician-submitted Medicare Part B claims for evaluation and management.5 The physician 
submitting this claim for evaluation and management is responsible for the patient’s 
emergency care; it is his decision whether or not to order testing for PE. Using physician 
identifiers, we track the behavior of all doctors who routinely evaluate Medicare patients in 
the ED.
We identify which ED patients are tested for a PE using bills submitted by radiologists for 
the interpretation of chest CTs with contrast, when the CT is performed within 1 day of the 
ED visit.6 We restrict our sample to physicians who order at least seven in sample CT scans 
between 2000–2009, since very low volume doctors provide too little information to 
accurately estimate physicians’ testing thresholds.7
While diagnosis of PE is the most common purpose of a chest CT performed in the 
emergency care setting, there are a small handful of other, less common indications, 
including pleural effusion, chest and lung cancers, traumas, and aortic dissection. For this 
reason, we exclude patients from the sample who are coded with a diagnosis related to 
trauma, pleural effusion, chest or lung cancer, or patients with a history of aortic aneurysm, 
aortic dissection, or other arterial dissection. We also exclude patients with a history of renal 
failure, since these patients are likely ineligible for a CT scan with contrast, due to risks of 
the contrast agent. These sample restrictions are designed to limit the sample to patients who 
may be eligible for a chest CT scan and for whom the scan is highly likely to have been 
ordered to detect PE; these assumptions are discussed in more detail in Appendix C.
Once we have identified relevant CT scans in billing data, we then need to code the test 
outcome, i.e. whether or not the scan detected a PE. Patients with acute PE are typically 
admitted to the hospital for monitoring and to begin a course of blood thinners or place a 
venous filter to reduce clotting risk. From the sample of patients tested in the emergency 
department with a chest CT, we identify positive tests on the basis of Medicare Part A 
hospital claims that include a diagnosis code for PE among any of the diagnoses associated 
with the hospital stay.
We have validated this approach to identifying positive tests by using cross-referenced 
patient chart and hospital billing data from two large academic medical centers. The 
evidence from these centers suggests that we are unlikely to understate physicians’ testing 
thresholds due to undercounting of positive test results. More detail on this data validation 
exercise is presented in Appendix D.
In addition to measuring whether patients were tested and the testing outcome, we also 
document a number of characteristics that allow us to predict the patient’s propensity to be 
5In particular, we identify patients based on CPT codes for emergency department evaluation and management: 99281, 99282, 99283, 
99284, 99285, and place of service 23 (i.e. hospital emergency department).
6We begin by identifying all bills for chest CTs on the basis of CPT codes 71260, 71270, and 71275.
7In our sample, this restriction drops about 1/2 of all CT scans since a large number of patients are evaluated by very low volume 
providers. Nonetheless, our sample likely includes the most policy relevant sample - it is difficult to target interventions at physicians 
who order a procedure less than once a year.
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diagnosed with a PE, including age, race, sex, and medical comorbidities. We code 
comorbidities from both Medicare’s Chronic Condition Warehouse and from the Elixhauser 
et al. (1998) definitions; while these sets of conditions overlap, the Chronic Condition 
Warehouse utilizes outpatient claims to code comorbidities whereas the Elixhauser 
comorbidities are based only on inpatient medical history, so they typically encode different 
levels of disease severity. We augment these standard sets of medical comorbidities to 
include several measures that are specific to PE risk: whether the patient was previously 
admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of PE, thoracic aortic dissection, abdominal aortic 
dissection, or deep vein thrombosis, and any cause admission to the hospital or surgical 
hospital admission within 7 days or 30 days.
3.2 Physician, hospital, and regional data
After using the Medicare claims data to estimate the testing threshold applied by each 
doctor, we explore predictors of physicians’ practice styles by linking testing thresholds to 
physician, hospital, and regional characteristics.
We draw physician data from two sources, the Medicare Physician Identification and 
Eligibility Registry (MPIER) and the American Medical Association Masterfile (AMA 
data). The MPIER and AMA both identify the medical school and graduation year for each 
physician, which we have linked to the US News & World Report medical school rankings. 
We bin schools according to whether they are typically ranked in the top 50 for either 
primary care or research rankings.
Hospital characteristics are drawn from the American Hospital Association annual survey. 
We use these data to observe whether the physician typically practices at a for profit hospital 
or an academic hospital, defined as a hospital with a board certified residency program.
Using provider zip codes, we identify the hospital referral region (HRR) in which each 
patient is treated. HRRs are regional health care markets defined by the Dartmouth Atlas to 
reflect areas within which patients commonly travel to receive tertiary care. There are 306 
HRRs in total. Using data from the Dartmouth Atlas, we link each HRR to the average 
spending per Medicare beneficiary to capture a broad measure of regional care intensity.
Finally, data on state malpractice environment is from Avraham (2011) Database of State 
Tort Law Reforms. Following prior work by Currie and MacLeod (2006) and Avraham et al. 
(2012), we focus on two key measures of malpractice law: whether a state has enacted 
malpractice damage caps on award amounts, and joint and several liability reform.
3.3 Summary statistics
There are 1.9 million emergency department visit evaluations in our dataset, after making 
the sample exclusions noted above. Of these patients evaluated in the ED, 3.8% of them are 
tested with a chest CT scan with contrast. Amongst tested patients, 6.9% of them receive a 
positive test, i.e. are admitted to the hospital within 24 hours with a diagnosis of PE.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1, with results reported separately for patients who 
do not receive a CT scan (column A), patients who receive a negative test (column B), and 
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patients with a positive test (column C). We observe the testing behavior of over 6600 
physicians, with an average of 284 ED patients per physician.
Patient demographics are similar across the untested and tested patient groups. The average 
age is 78 years in the untested sample and slightly lower (77 years) in the sample of patients 
with negative or positive tests. Patients who test negative are more than twice as likely to 
have a history of PE as untested patients; patients with positive tests are five times more 
likely to have a history of PE than untested patients.
We note a few modest differences in physician background and practice environment across 
patient groups. Patients with negative tests are evaluated by doctors with five months less 
experience on average than patients with positive tests, and were treated in regions with 1% 
higher Medicare spending per beneficiary, compared to patients with positive tests. Among 
tested patients, those with positive tests were 1 percentage point more likely to have been 
evaluated by a doctor trained at a top tier medical school. In the structural model, we will 
decompose to what extent these differences may be driven by differential sorting of high risk 
patients and to what extent they reflect differences in physician practice styles.
3.4 Reduced form evidence of heterogeneity in doctor testing behavior
Before describing our model, we consider reduced form evidence of heterogeneity in 
doctors’ testing behavior. We first divide doctors in our sample into 10 deciles according to 
the average fraction of patients tested. We observe average testing rates that range from 
1.7% of ED patients in the lowest physician decile to 8.2% of ED patients in the highest 
physician decile. We want to know whether this variation reflects differences in doctor 
behavior for patients with similar PE risk, or differences in patient PE risk for physicians 
with similar testing intensities.
We can separate these hypotheses by comparing rates of positive tests conditional on testing 
behavior. If doctors who test more do so because their patients are at higher risk of PE, we 
should expect that doctors with higher testing rates will also have a higher fraction of 
positive tests among tested patients.8 Alternatively, if doctors who test more do so because 
they are the type that tests more for any given level of patient risk, then we expect to find 
that physicians who test more also have a lower fraction of positive tests among tested 
patients. In the latter case, physicians could differ in the threshold probability at which they 
think testing is worthwhile, and physicians who test more are moving further down the 
expected benefits curve.
To illustrate this point, we have sketched a stylized picture of the testing decision in Figure 
1. Patients are sorted along the x-axis according to their risk of PE, qid, from highest risk to 
lowest risk. The x-axis corresponds to the cumulative fraction of patients, and the y-axis 
corresponds to the marginal patient’s PE risk qid, so that each point (x, y) along the plotted 
curve shows the fraction x of patients for whom qid ≥ y. For example, at point (TA = 2/3, τA 
8In particular, both doctors would have similar test yields among marginal tested patients, but the doctor who tests more would have a 
higher test yield among the higher risk inframarginal patients. We formalize the points in this section in the context of our structural 
model in section 4.
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= 1/2) in Panel A, the graph indicates that 2/3 of patients have a risk of PE that equals or 
exceeds 1/2. (We use this unrealistically high risk for illustrative purposes.)
In Panel A, we consider two doctors with the same patient distribution of PE risk, but with 
different testing thresholds. Doctor A tests every patient whose personal PE risk qid exceeds 
Doctor A’s testing threshold τA, and likewise Doctor B tests all patients for whom qid > τB. 
Because Doctor B’s threshold is lower than Doctor A’s, i.e. τB< τA, Doctor B tests a greater 
fraction of patients, TB > TA. Doctor B’s tested patients have a lower average PE risk than 
Doctor A’s tested patients, so Doctor B’s test yield ZB—i.e. the fraction of positive tests 
among tested patients—is lower than Doctor A’s test yield ZA, as can be seen in the graph. 
In this panel, there is a downward sloping relationship between the fraction of patients each 
doctor tests and his average test yield.
In Panel B, we consider an alternate scenario which could also explain why Doctor B 
continues to test a greater fraction of his patients than Doctor A, i.e. why TB > TA. In this 
example, doctor A and Doctor B have the same testing threshold, so . Given the same 
expected patient PE risk, Doctors A and B would arrive at the same testing decision. 
However, the two doctors now face different distributions of patient PE risk. For any given 
probability of a positive test, Doctor B sees (weakly) more patients with qid exceeding the 
common threshold for testing. In other words, Doctor B’s patient population is higher risk 
than Doctor A’s. As can be seen in the graph, Doctor B’s test yield ZB′ will be higher than 
Doctor A’s test yield ZA′, even though both doctors have the same testing threshold, since 
more of the mass in Doctor B’s distribution of patient risk is concentrated at higher risk 
levels. In contrast with Panel A, there is now an upward sloping relationship between the 
fraction of patients each doctor has tested and his average test yield.
Now turning to our observed Medicare data, we use a simple binned scatterplot to explore 
whether variation in risk for PE or variation in testing behavior can explain the differences in 
physicians’ testing propensities. We begin by binning physicians into deciles according to 
the fraction of patients they test; next we calculate the fraction of tested patients for whom 
PE was detected within each decile. This relationship between fraction tested and average 
test yield is plotted in Figure 2 Panel A. The graph displays a generally downward sloping 
relationship between average testing probability along the x-axis and fraction of tested 
patients with detected PE along the y-axis. Doctors who test a greater fraction of their 
patients are less likely to find positive test outcomes among tested patients; a simple 
regression reveals this relationship is highly significant. The figure suggests that differences 
in testing thresholds across doctors may be an important determinant of observed 
heterogeneity in testing behavior. It appears that doctors who are more likely to test their 
patients compared to their peers are also testing more low-risk patients.
Our structural model formalizes the intuition described above. It is designed to disentangle 
(observable and unobservable) differences in patient PE risk from differences in physician 
testing thresholds and evaluate the contribution of each to observed variation in testing 
behavior, following the intuition of this simple empirical exercise. We discuss the structural 
model in more detail in Section 4 below.
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3.5 Reduced form evidence of misweighting patient PE risk factors
In addition to considering heterogeneity in physicians’ testing thresholds, we also investigate 
whether physicians are successfully identifying observable risk factors associated with the 
highest probability of positive tests and testing patients with those characteristics. 
Determining which patients should be tested requires complex, subtle judgments about 
clinical risk on the basis of many factors. In our data, we capture some of the most common 
and relevant comorbidities by analyzing patients’ claims histories. Guided by the structural 
analysis that follows, we motivate our exploration of misweighting PE risk with a few 
simple examples.
Consider a comparison of patients with a history of prostate cancer to those with no such 
history. Patients with a history of prostate cancer are no more likely to be tested for PE than 
patients without that condition; in fact, testing rates are slightly lower among prostate cancer 
patients (3.7%) compared to the rest of the population (3.8%). However, it turns out that 
among tested individuals, prostate cancer patients are over 50% more likely to be diagnosed 
with PE than patients with no such history.
In Figure 2 Panel B, we see that for each decile of doctors’ overall testing rate, doctors are 
equally or more likely to test patients without prostate cancer, despite the consistently higher 
PE risk among patients with prostate cancer. As described in the previous section, in the 
absence of variation in physician practice style, we would expect this graph to be upward 
sloping: doctors who tested more patients would do so because they have higher risk patients 
and higher expected test yields. Splitting the sample by comorbidity, if patients with a given 
comorbidity have higher yield they should also be tested at higher rates.
A PE risk score popularly used to guide physicians on whether to order diagnostic testing 
includes treatment for cancer malignancy among its 7 risk criteria (Wells et al. 1995; Wells 
et al. 1998; Wells et al. 2000). And yet, although cancer is a recognized clinical risk factor 
for PE, a relationship supported by our data, it appears that patients with a history of prostate 
cancer are no more likely to be tested than the average ED patient. This provides the first 
suggestive evidence that physicians may not be properly accounting for the increased PE 
risk associated with prostate cancer, and thus may be under-testing prostate cancer patients 
relative to the rest of the population.
In Table 2, we highlight the basic summary statistics for eight of the clinical factors that 
show significant evidence of misweighting in the structural model that follows. Similar to 
the case of prostate cancer, we find that black patients are less likely to be tested than non-
black patients, even though among tested patients, the rate of positive tests is much higher 
for black patients. Figure 2 Panel C illustrates the lower test rates and higher test yield of 
black patients within every decile of physician test rate. A reverse pattern holds for patients 
with ischemic heart disease, atrial fibrilation or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(COPD); they are tested at similar or higher rates than patients without those conditions, 
despite the fact that tested patients with these conditions are approximately 30% less likely 
to have a PE detected. Figure 2 Panel D shows the test rates are substantially higher and 
yields lower for pateints with COPD, within each decile of physician test rate.
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For other conditions, physicians respond in the right direction but overweight or 
underweight that condition relative to what would maximize the incidence of positive tests. 
The model implies that, everything else held equal (including other patient characteristics 
and physician thresholds), two comorbidities which have the same marginal impact on 
testing behavior should also have the same marginal impact on the conditional likelihood of 
a positive test. Our model identifies a few factors which appear to have a disproportionate 
impact on the likelihood of a positive test given their impact on testing behavior: a past 
history of PE, deep vein thrombosis, or a recent hospital admission are associated with 20 to 
90 percent higher rates of testing but are 140 to 200 percent more likely to have a PE 
detected, a disproportionate increase relative to other factors in our model with a similar 
impact on testing behavior.
This exploration of misweighting presumes that patients with and without a particular risk 
factor don’t differ in their other comorbidities and are sorting to ED physicians with similar 
testing thresholds. In the structural model, we formalize this analysis, explicitly modeling 
differences in testing rates that may be driven by physician’s testing thresholds or other PE 
risk factors.
4 Model of testing behavior
Our reduced form results suggest that physicians vary in their testing intensity and that 
physicians may not be allocating tests in a way that maximizes test yields. Our structural 
model embeds both possibilities and allows us to assess the quantitative importance of each 
inefficiency.
First consider the question of how we can identify variation in physicians’ practice style. In 
a world with random assignment of patients to doctors, a simple comparison of average 
testing rates across doctors could recover physicians’ testing intensities, since there would be 
no cross-doctor variation in patients’ ex ante PE risk. After adjusting for statistical noise, the 
variation in physician testing rates with random patient assignment would tell us whether 
physicians vary in their testing intensity for identical patients. Unfortunately, in our setting
—as in many cases of interest—patients are not randomly assigned to physicians. If we 
regressed testing behavior on physician fixed effects, those fixed effects would jointly 
capture both physicians’ testing tendencies and the suitability of each physician’s patient 
population for testing. Since some doctors see patients with greater ex ante risk, we cannot 
attribute all variation in physician fixed effects to differences in doctor testing intensities.
To recover a measure of practice style that is purged of variation due to different patient 
populations, we apply an insight from Chandra and Staiger (2011) (hereafter, CS) which 
builds upon classical selection models developed by Heckman (1979) and Heckman and 
MaCurdy (1980). CS’s insight closely parallels the logic in Section 3.4. In their model, if 
physician A is more inclined to treat any given patient than physician B, then physician A’s 
marginal patients should have lower returns to treatment. Estimation of the original CS 
model requires observing the individual-specific return to treatment for all treated 
individuals, a difficult object to recover if one does not have random patient assignment. We 
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adapt the model to cover diagnostic testing, where test results (positive or negative) can 
proxy for the impact of treatment on the treated.9
As noted in the introduction, the distinctive feature of positive tests which eliminates the 
need to separately estimate or assume treatment effects arises in many other settings of 
interest. The essential ingredient is that we need only observe outcomes among treated 
individuals; counterfactual outcomes if treated patients had not been treated are known. Test 
yield is zero among untested patients: PE would not have been detected without this test. As 
a result, we can use test outcomes among tested patients to analyze whether physicians 
sucessfully maximize test yields for a given number of tests. Likewise, a bank deciding 
whether to extend credit learns exactly the profits they received from a given customer once 
the loan term is reached and they know whether default occurred. Similarly, a firm deciding 
which applicants to hire knows how much productivity they generated from a given 
employee once the employee has completed a given employment spell.
In contrast, our model would not directly extend to a doctor deciding which patients to treat 
with a drug in order to minimize stroke risk. In that case, we would not know the impact of 
the drug just from observing whether a patient had a stroke, because we would not know 
what the value of the objective function (strokes) would have been absent treatment. 
Likewise, if the employer’s objective were to maximize the productivity of a given employee 
regardless of which firm they end up in (perhaps a more reasonable objective for a policy-
maker), we would not know whether that employee would have been more productive 
elsewhere. Our model is not directly applicable in such cases without further structure and 
assumptions.10
In the setting of diagnostic tests, the CS intuition becomes very simple because test yield is 0 
among untested patients. Suppose physician A is more inclined to test than physician B, in 
the sense that physician A tests all patients with a probability of a positive test greater than 
4% while physician B tests all patients with a probability of a positive test greater than 5%. 
Then by looking directly at test yields for each doctor’s marginal patients, we can recover 
her threshold: those patients whom physician A is indifferent between testing and not testing 
have a test yield of 4%, while those patients whom physician B is indifferent between testing 
and not testing have a yield of 5%. Our model uses cross-doctor heterogeneity in test yield 
among marginal patients to identify variation in physician testing thresholds, which tell us 
whether physicians would behave differently given identical patient populations.
To identify misallocation of tests, we ask whether different patient characteristics which 
predict the same change in testing probabilities also predict the same change in yield 
conditional on testing. If we find that, for example, patients with and without prostate cancer 
are tested at the same rates but patients with prostate cancer are much more likely to test 
positive conditional on being tested, this suggests that one could increase test yield by 
testing more patients with prostate cancer.
9Given our assumption that negative test results do not improve patient health ex post, the testing outcome can proxy for the impact of 
treatment on the treated, as long as the benefits of treating a detected PE are constant across patients. The clinical basis for this 
assumption is discussed at greater length in Appendix B.
10We extend the model to investigate the use of Warfarin to prevent strokes in Abaluck, Agha and Chan (2016).
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For our analysis of both physician practice style and test misallocation, considering 
counterfactuals requires us to predict how test yield would change if physicians test more or 
fewer patients with a given set of observable characteristics. Following CS (and more 
generally Heckman and Vytlacil 2005), we recover this information by estimating the 
relationship between test yields and testing probabilities (or more precisely, predicted 
indices of testing propensity). In the exposition below, we make explicit the conditions under 
which the relationship between test yields and testing probabilities fully captures how 
marginal benefits decline as physicians test more patients.
Our exposition will proceed as follows. First we lay out the CS model with the adaptation 
described above—i.e. replacing the returns to treatment with the probability of a positive test
—and describe how we can recover each physician’s testing intensity. In section 4.2, we 
extend the CS modeling framework to capture the possibility that physicians may not select 
patients to test in a way that maximizes test yield. In section 4.3, we discuss how physician 
thresholds, misweighting, and the degree of selection on unobservables can be jointly 
identified. In section 4.4, we provide further details on how our model is estimated.
4.1 A Chandra-Staiger Model of Testing
Assume that the suitability of a patient for testing is determined entirely by the ex ante 
likelihood of a positive test. We define qid to be the conditional probability of a positive test 
for patient i evaluated by doctor d, given all the information available to the doctor:
(1)
where xid are observed patient characteristics (which we assume throughout are normalized 
to have mean 0 for each doctor), αd are doctor fixed effects, and ηid are factors observable to 
the doctor but unobservable to the econometrician which impact the likelihood that a test is 
positive. Note that the inclusion of physician fixed effects ad allows the population risk of 
PE to vary across doctors in ways that are not captured by the included patient covariates.11
Following the typical structure of Heckman selection models, we begin by assuming that ηid 
is independently and identically distributed across patients and doctors; we refer to this as 
the “ignorability assumption” following the prior literature. (We explore relaxing the 
ignorability assumption in Section 6.) We further assume that ηid has full support; note it is 
also bounded because qid lies between 0 and 1.
Following CS, we make the structural modeling assumption that physicians test if and only 
if the probability of a positive test qid exceeds a physician-specific threshold τd. That is, they 
test if and only if:
(2)
11CS interpret αd to reflect variation in expertise rather than differences in patient population. In our setting, where there is separation 
between the diagnostician ordering the test and the radiologist conducting it, and less expected skill dispersion in interpreting the test, 
we focus instead on the possibility that some doctors see a patient population which is ex ante more likely to have PEs.
Abaluck et al. Page 14
Am Econ Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 November 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
which implies that:
(3)
where the functional form of f(xidβ + αd − τd) = Pr(ηid > − (xidβ + αd − τd)) depends on the 
distribution of ηid. By estimating equation 3, we can calculate the probability that a patient 
with a given set of observables is tested by doctor d, which will be a nonlinear function of 
the testing propensity index Iid = xidβ + αd − τd.
τd is our measure of physician treatment intensity holding patient population fixed. 
Physicians with lower τd are more likely to test any given patient: they have a lower 
threshold probability at which they decide testing is worthwhile. If we had random 
assignment of patients to physicians, then we would know that αd = α for all physicians and 
could recover τd directly from estimation of equation 3 (at least up to a normalization 
constant). Without random assignment, αd and τd are not separately identified from 
observed testing decisions; to separate them, we will need to use data on test outcomes.
Let Zid denote a binary variable indicating whether the test is positive or negative, which we 
observe only for tested patients. If every patient were tested, we would observe Zid for the 
entire sample and could recover β and αd by estimating the linear probability model implied 
by equation 1 using OLS. (Of course, if every patient were tested, there would be no 
variation in doctor testing thresholds.) In practice, we only observe whether a test is positive 
or negative for those patients whom doctors choose to test, so there is a selection problem; 
this is the standard selection problem originally studied by Heckman (1979).
Formally, we model testing outcomes as follows:
(4)
where h(xidβ + αd − τd) ≡ E(ηid|qid > τd) = E(ηid|ηid > − Iid) and λ(Iid) ≡ Iid + h(Iid). Test 
yields are a function of physician thresholds and the propensity to test.
For marginal patients whom doctors are indifferent between testing and not testing, λ(Iid) = 
E(Iid + ηid|Iid + ηid = 0) = 0, so E(qid|Testid) = τd. If a physician tests all patients with a 
probability of a positive test greater than 3%, then for marginal patients (with the minimum 
observed value of Iid among tested patients), the positive test probability is exactly 3%. The 
probablity of a positive test will generally rise among inframarginal tested patients, who are 
more likely to be tested based on observables and doctor fixed effects than marginal patients.
The binned scatterplot of testing rates and test yields described in section 3.4 can provide 
some intuition for understanding this model. Variation in testing propensities Iid could be 
driven by differences in patient PE risk, either through differences in observed comorbidities 
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xid or unobserved population risk αd. Alternatively, differences in testing propensities could 
be explained by differences in physician testing thresholds τd.
If all variation across doctors in testing behavior were driven by patient PE risk, then 
physicians with higher average testing propensities will have higher test yields. This 
relationship is apparent in the last line of equation 4; if we hold τd fixed and increase Iid, 
E(qid|Testid = 1) will increase.12 On the other hand, variation in physician testing thresholds 
τd will lead to a downward sloping relationship between testing propensities Iid and test 
yields E(Zid|qid > τd). This relationship is apparent from the first line of equation 4; if we 
hold αd fixed and raise testing propensities by decreasing τd, then E(qid|Testid = 1) will 
decrease. The model derivation formalizes the intuitive argument made in section 3.4, which 
interpreted the observed downward sloping relationship between doctors’ average fraction of 
patients tested and test yield as evidence of variation in testing thresholds.
In sum, average test yields for marginal patients will reveal testing thresholds τd among 
doctors who evaluate enough marginal patients in our sample. Estimating the relationship 
between higher testing propensities and higher test yields for physicians with known τd will 
identify the function λ(·), which allows us to recover τd even for lower volume doctors who 
do not test marginal patients in our sample. Identification is discussed more formally in 
Section 4.3. The model so far allows us to identify differences in physician testing intensity 
for fixed patient populations and to simulate how physician testing behavior and outcomes 
would change if physician practice styles were more uniform.
4.2 Misweighting of patient risk
A key difference between our model and Chandra and Staiger (2011) is that we extend the 
model laid out above to allow for the possibility that doctors may not successfully select 
patients on the basis of observable comorbidities to maximize test yields for a given number 
of tests. We previously assumed that the coefficients β attached to patient observables when 
doctors decide which patients to test reflect the true relationship between those 
characteristics and the likelihood of a positive test. This need not be the case. Doctors may 
under- or over-weight the importance of different risk factors, so that testing is not 
necessarily targeted at the highest risk patients.
Assume that each doctor’s belief about the probability of a positive test is given by:
(5)
while the actual probability remains:
(6)
12This is satisfied as long as λ(Iid) = E(ηid + Iid|ηid + Iid > 0) is upward sloping in the function Iid. This restriction holds for many 
general distributions of ηid, including, for example, under distributions meeting the restriction that ηid is symmetric and mean 0.
Abaluck et al. Page 16
Am Econ Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 November 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
In this model, doctors test if . Note that if ,  can be rewritten as:
(7)
Thus, it is without loss of generality to assume that  while noting that one reason for 
variation in thresholds τd is that physicians may have mistaken beliefs about patient PE risk 
αd. We cannot distinguish between the case where some physicians test more because they 
have a lower threshold and the case where some physicians test more because they 
mistakenly believe their patients are more likely to test positive than is actually the case.13
We define the new testing propensity  to reflect the observed propensity 
given physician beliefs about β′. With this change, we can rewrite the test outcomes 
equation:
(8)
The above derivation is identical to equation 4, except now the observables xid directly enter 
the test outcomes equation, even after conditioning on the propensity to test. In other words, 
the model implies that if observables xid continue to have explanatory power after 
conditioning on the propensity Iid, then physicians are not weighting those observables in 
the manner that would maximize the incidence of positive tests.
How can we rule out the possibility that untested patients with a given set of observables are 
known based on unobservables not to have a PE? The function λ(·) reveals this information 
given the assumptions we have made about the distribution of unobservables. This point can 
be seen most directly by rearranging equation 8 into the form of the first line of equation 4. 
That is, we can write:
(9)
where . Written this way, αd + xidβ reflects the 
average return for all patients in the population with this set of observables and 
reflects the fact that the more patients one tests (as one lowers τd and thus raises ), the 
more one moves down the marginal benefit curve and tests patients who are likely to have a 
lower test yield given unobservables.
13Note that an analogous argument implies that it is without loss of generality to allow testing thresholds to vary with observables. 
That is, suppose . Then we can replace β′ with β″ = β′ − γ. In other words, the hypotheses that physicians test 
patients with a given observable more because they believe those patients are more likely to test positive and that physicians test 
patients with a given observable more because physicians have a lower testing threshold for patients of that type are empirically 
indistinguishable.
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4.3 Identification
Equation 8 shows that test yields among tested patients depend on physician thresholds (τd), 
allocation of tests to patients (xid(β − β′)) and a selection term. As is typical for Heckman 
selection models, the selection term λ(·) can be identified using functional form restrictions, 
but it would be desirable for λ(·) to be semiparametrically identified. We lay out below how 
semiparametric identification is possible in our setting and how our identifying assumption 
differs from that used in CS due to the possibility of misallocation.
The CS model is essentially the model we outline in Section 4.1—the one difference is that 
the dependent variable in equation 4 of our model is whether a patient tested positive rather 
than an estimate of the causal treatment effect for that patient. In the CS model, 
identification comes from the fact that xid only enters the test outcome equation (i.e. 
equation 4) via λ(Iid). In that model, xid are excluded from directly entering the test 
outcomes equation and we can think of them as instrumental variables which aid in the 
estimation of λ(·), parallel to the standard instrumental variables identification in Heckman 
selection models (e.g. Mulligan and Rubinstein 2008). This restriction is no longer valid if 
physicians incorrectly assess the PE risk associated with some observable comorbidities and 
demographics xid. In the model with misweighting, equation 8 above shows that xid directly 
enters the test outcomes equation with coefficients that are not known from estimating the 
equation governing selection into testing.
In order to generalize the model to the case where doctors fail to appropriately weight 
observable risk factors in deciding whom to test, we consider an additional set of exclusion 
restrictions.14 We exploit the fact that τd can be directly estimated for physicians testing 
patients we can identify as marginal.15 Marginal tested patients are those with the lowest 
observed values of the testing propensity  who are still tested. We estimate the average 
probability of a positive test among these marginal tested patients. For these patients who are 
“just barely worth testing,” the observed probability of a positive test reveals the threshold at 
which doctors are willing to test.
Formally, since ηid is bounded with full support, there exists some value of the propensity in 
the testing equation  such that patients are only tested for . For those marginal tested 
patients with , we know the realization of ηid is just barely sufficient to tip these 
patients across the testing threshold, so that . Since λ(Iid) = Iid + 
h(Iid), it follows that  for these marginal tested patients.
Let QQd denote the average rate of positive tests Zid among tested marginal patients for 
doctor d; taking the expectation of equation 8 yields:
(10)
14CS discuss the identification strategy outlined in this paragraph and consider it as a robustness check, but do not directly use it when 
estimating their model.
15More precisely, τd is known modulo a misweighting adjustment we spell out below.
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In the equation above, Em,d(xid|Testid = 1) denotes the expectation of xid only among doctor 
d’s tested marginal patients m. The likelihood of a positive test for those tested patients with 
the lowest testing propensities is given by the physician’s threshold τd plus an adjustment 
for the fact that the actual likelihood of a positive test for these patients differs from 
physician’s beliefs because β ≠ β′. This calculation provides an exclusion restriction—after 
subtracting the average yield among a doctor’s marginal tested patients from both sides, 
doctor fixed effects are excluded for those physicians in equation 8. A more detailed 
derivation of this result is in Appendix E.
This exclusion restriction also suffices to identify λ(·). Intuitively, suppose that by studying 
marginal tested patients, we uncover multiple physicians with identical thresholds τd. These 
doctors may still differ in their propensity to test for identical observables θd = αd − τd, 
because they may treat patient populations with different PE risk αd. After conditioning on 
τd, any remaining doctor-level variation in test outcomes must be explained by differences in 
patient risk αd, and the functional form relating αd to test outcomes will flexibly identify the 
shape of the λ(·) function.
For example, suppose we see many doctors who all share the same test threshold. Some of 
these doctors test more patients than others because their patient population is riskier (higher 
αd). If a small increase in a patient’s test probability predicts a large increase in test yield 
among tested patients (correlating to a much higher αd), this implies that risk factors 
observable to the doctor but not observable by the econometrician must heavily influence 
test yields and thus testing choices. Because a small change in testing behavior correlates 
with a large change in patient risk, λ(I) will be steeply sloped. Technically, this result arises 
because the density of ηid will be smaller as dispersion in ηid increases, placing fewer 
patients in a given neighborhood of the doctor’s threshold. Alternatively, if the distribution 
of unobserved PE risk is less dispersed, i.e. unobservables exert less influence on testing 
decisions and test outcomes, a given increase in a patient’s test probability will predict a 
smaller increase in test yield among tested patients (correlating to a smaller increase in αd), 
implying that λ(I) will be relatively flat.
In addition to the validity of the exclusion restrictions, the other crucial identifying 
restriction underlying this estimation approach is the ignorability assumption: ηid is 
additively separable and i.i.d. across doctors and patients. The ignorability assumption 
implies that the function λ(·) is the same for different doctors and patients. If this 
assumption were violated and ηid were distributed differently across doctors, the function 
λ(·) could be doctor-specific. In Section 6.2, we consider one such model and show that it 
does not materially impact our results.
In our baseline model, the ignorability assumption contributes to the identification of test 
yield among currently untested patients. What would happen to test yields if a doctor 
lowered his threshold (from τ0 to τ1) and tested more patients on the margin? The definition 
of the threshold immediately tells us the new test yield among marginal patients (τ1). The 
fact that λ(Iid) embeds information about the entire distribution of ηid allows us to infer test 
outcomes among inframarginal patients as well. Ideally, this variation is “in sample” in the 
sense that we observe other doctors with a threshold as low as the value we would like to 
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simulate and can trace out how test yields relate to test probabilities for patients of those 
doctors. In our baseline model, ignorability implies that this function is the same for all 
doctors and the threshold varies the y-intercept in (test probability, test yield) space.
The identification of misweighting also relies on the ignorability assumption. The 
ignorability assumption implies that if doctors were optimally assessing PE risk, any two 
conditions with the same β′ weight in the testing equation should induce the same change in 
the fraction of positive tests amongst tested patients, holding all other comorbidities and 
testing thresholds constant. If two conditions with the same β′ weight in the testing equation 
lead to different changes in the fraction of positive tests, then we identify misweighting; we 
conclude the risk factor that induces the larger increase in positive tests is underweighted 
relative to the other factor. The slope of the function λ(·) with respect to known variation in 
αd pins down how xid should impact test outcomes Zid given β′—so we can in principle 
identify misweighting even with just a single x variable. This strategy echoes the logic of the 
reduced form evidence on misweighting presented in section 3.5, but the additional structure 
allows us to make more detailed comparisons of weighting and risk across conditions, after 
accounting for differences in patient risk and testing thresholds across doctors.
Empirically, the ignorability assumption may be undermined if the distribution of 
unobserved patient PE risk differs across conditions. For example, if fewer patients with the 
risk factor that appears to be under-weighted present to the ED with the relevant PE 
symptoms (e.g. chest pain, shortness of breath, elevated heart rate), then it may be that 
physicians are already testing every patient in the relevant at-risk population. This 
assumption is directly analogous to the standard exogeneity assumption used in virtually all 
structural models; e.g. just as discrete choice models assume that observed product 
characteristics are independent of the error term, our misweighting model is identified by 
assuming that specific observed characteristics are not systematically related to unobserved 
determinants of PE risk.
With unlimited data, we could relax the ignorability assumption. If for every set of xid, we 
observed sufficient variation in doctor testing choices for patients of that type, we could 
directly estimate the distribution of ηid conditional on xid and check whether testing more 
patients with a specific underweighted factor leads to more positive tests. In other words, we 
could allow the function λ(·) in our model to be a different function for every set of xid. In 
practice, we estimate the overall degree of selection on unobservables (assuming ηid does 
not depend on xid), but we lack sufficient data to estimate a separate distribution for each set 
of xid.
An additional subtlety of our estimation approach is that many doctors test only a small 
number of patients, so we do not necessarily observe marginal patients for all doctors. Given 
the ignorability assumption, we can still identify λ(·) from the doctors for whom we do 
observe marginal patients, and thus determine τd for other doctors.
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4.4 Estimation of the parametric model
Let us now specify precisely how we estimate the structural model outlined in the previous 
sections. Define θ′d = α′d − τd. Plugging our specification for the probability of a positive 
test from equation 5 into the testing equation 2 yields the final form of the testing equation:
(11)
These assumptions yield a binary choice model of testing. In our baseline specification, we 
assume that ηid is i.i.d. across doctors and patients with a parametric distribution we 
describe below. Thus, patients’ ex ante risk distributions may have different means (xidβ + 
αd) but are assumed to be otherwise identically distributed. In section 6, we estimate 
versions of the model which (separately) relax the parametric assumption and allow for 
heteroskedasticity across doctors in the distribution of patient PE risk.
The most common parametric assumptions in binary choice models—normal and logit—are 
inconsistent with our model because qid must lie between 0 and 1. Instead, we assume that 
each ηid is drawn from a two parameter distribution which is a mixture of a Bernoulli and a 
uniform distribution. With probability 1 − p, ηid ~ U[−η, η] and with probability p, pid ~ 
U[υ − η, υ + η]. Intuitively, this distribution captures the idea that most patients are not 
candidates for a CT scan. A small fraction of patients p present with symptoms of PE such 
as chest pain and given those symptoms, there is a range of ex ante risks parameterized by η. 
We assume that patients are never tested unless they receive the shock υ (i.e. unless they 
present with PE symptoms).
In addition to these clinical reasons, there are several methodological advantages to this 
distribution. Among bounded distributions, a uniform distribution is attractive because it 
leads to a particularly tractable linear selection term λ(·). The mixture distribution has two 
methodological advantages over a pure uniform: firstly, if p = 1 (the uniform case), the 
estimated variance of η is so large that it implies qid < 0 for some patients, which is 
inconsistent since qid is a probability. Secondly, since testing is a low probability event, a 
uniform distribution would imply that more precise information (a higher variance of ηid, 
meaning that doctors have more private information about test outcomes) leads doctors to 
test more everything else held equal; the mixture distribution allows for the possibility that 
more precise information leads to less testing. This second point is especially relevant in the 
heteroskedastic model considered in Section 6.2 where the variance of ηid is allowed to vary 
across doctors. To demonstrate that our results are not driven by this specific choice of 
parametric distribution, we also estimate the model semiparametrically as a robustness check 
in Section 6.3.
In Appendix E, we show that this distributional assumption implies:
(12)
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where . Estimation of this equation by non-linear least squares allows us to 
recover  and  which we use to construct an estimate of the testing 
propensity .
Following the steps outlined in the previous section, the testing threshold parameters τd can 
be recovered from a regression of test outcomes (i.e. positive or negative for detecting PE) 
on doctor fixed effects, controlling for the propensity  estimated from the testing equation. 
Note that under the parametric assumptions we have made so far, 
. As shown in more detail in Appendix E, this implies that:
(13)
As discussed in section 4.3, we avoid relying solely on functional form to identify the 
coefficient on  by estimating τd directly for doctors with tested marginal patients based on 
the observed average rate of positive tests among those marginal patients, . We define 
marginal patients as patients in the first decile of  among tested patients; this definition is 
conservative from the standpoint of detecting overtesting since more restrictive definitions 
(e.g. the first percentile) will tend to lead to lower estimated thresholds. We show in 
Appendix Table A.1 how our estimates change for alternative definitions of marginal 
patients. As expected, we estimate lower τd (and thus more implied overtesting) using more 
restrictive definitions.
Subtracting  from both sides of equation 13 yields:
(14)
where Yid = Zid for doctors with no tested marginal patients and  for doctors 
with marginal patients, Md is an indicator for whether a doctor has marginal patients, Xid = 
(xid − Em,d(xid)) for doctors with marginal patients and xid for doctors with no marginal 
patients.
One could estimate equation 14 in two steps—first, estimating the model among doctors 
with marginal patients with doctor fixed effects omitted to recover  and β − β′, and then 
estimating the model among doctors with non-marginal patients to recover the full set of 
doctor thresholds τd. Because fixing either  or β − β′ would be sufficient to identify 
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equation 14 for doctors with non-marginal patients, estimating the model jointly for all 
doctors uses additional information about the relative value of the parameters for doctors 
with non-marginal patients; this increases the precision of the estimates but has little impact 
on the magnitude of the coefficients.
Least squares estimation of equation 14 will allow us to recover the constant  and doctor 
fixed effects τd for non-marginal patients which, when combined with our estimates for 
marginal patients from , can be used to recover the full distribution of estimated .
The distribution of  combines both the true underlying variation in τd and estimation error 
from the fact that each τd is imprecisely estimated. To correct for estimation error, we apply 
an “empirical Bayes” technique to recover moments of the true underlying distribution of τd. 
Our approach is described in detail in Appendix F.16 Unlike more standard estimators (such 
as Kane and Staiger 2008), this technique is robust to the fact that we observe only a small 
number of observations per doctor and makes no distributional assumptions about either the 
true distribution of τd or the estimation error. The true distribution cannot be 
nonparametrically identified, but we can recover moments of that distribution; we report the 
mean and standard deviation. Simulation results do require us to recover a posterior estimate 
of τd for each doctor, and for these exercises we impose a further assumption that τd is log-
normally distributed as described in Appendix F.
5 Results
In this section, we report results of the estimation strategy described in section 4.4 above. 
First, we describe the recovered distribution of physician testing thresholds and test how 
physicians’ training and practice environment are related to testing intensity. Then, we report 
results on which risk factors are under- and over-weighted in physicians’ risk assessments 
relative to the weighting that would maximize detection of positive tests and consider 
possible clinical explanations for these patterns. Finally, we simulate how variation in test 
thresholds and the presence of misweighting affects physicians’ test yields.
5.1 Distribution and correlates of physician testing thresholds
After estimating the model laid out in Section 4 and applying the empirical Bayes 
adjustment, we find the mean value of τd is 0.056 and and the standard deviation is 0.054.17 
In other words, the average doctor is willing to test a patient provided the doctor’s estimate 
of the probability of a positive test exceeds 5.6%. Note that this positive test rate includes 
tests which detect actual PEs and false positives. The standard deviation of 0.054 suggests 
that there is a large amount of heterogeneity across doctors in their testing thresholds, with 
some doctors testing almost all patients displaying the relevant symptoms, and other doctors 
testing only patients with very substantial PE risk. Considering that the overall test yield in 
16We use quotation marks since our procedure is not a traditional empirical Bayes appraoch: we do not derive our estimator as the 
posterior of any specific distribution.
17Note that of course this would not be consistent with a normal distribution since in this case τd > 0 for all doctors or they would test 
every patient. In our welfare exercises we assume a log-normal distribution.
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our sample is only 6.9%, it is likely that this variation in testing thresholds may affect testing 
decisions for many patients.
We next consider regressions of the estimated testing thresholds  on doctor, hospital and 
regional characteristics to explore the determinants of practice style. Specifically, we regress 
 on variables capturing doctor experience (the number of years since the doctor graduated 
from medical school), whether the medical school the doctor attended is ranked in the top 50 
for research or primary care by US News & World Report, whether the hospital where the 
physician practices is a for profit hospital or an academic hospital, regional medical 
spending, the state tort environment, and average income in the region.
We consider OLS estimates as well as FGLS estimates which take into account the 
estimation error in the dependent variable τd.18 For each specification, we consider models 
with and without hospital fixed effects. Including hospital fixed effects to identify the impact 
of within-hospital variation in physician characteristics obviates the concern that our model 
omits unobserved differences in the cost of testing at the hospital level. For example, there 
may be variation in the opportunity cost of testing, depending on whether the CT scan is 
used to capacity. This heterogeneity will be absorbed into the hospital fixed effect.
Table 3 reports the results. We find that doctors in higher spending regions have lower 
testing thresholds, i.e. they are more likely to test low risk patients. A 10% increase in 
regional spending, as reported by the Dartmouth Atlas, is associated with a 0.4 percentage 
point decline in testing thresholds, significant at the 1% level. This finding provides 
empirical support for the hypothesis that high spending regions are providing lower marginal 
value, “flat of the curve” medical care.
We also find evidence that more experienced doctors have higher testing thresholds: a 10-
year increase in doctor experience is associated with 0.7 percentage point higher testing 
thresholds, significant at the 1% level. This relationship persists after controlling for hospital 
fixed effects, suggesting that even within the same institution, more experienced doctors are 
less likely to test low-risk patients. Unfortunately, we do not observe enough testing 
decisions per physician to estimate the model with year-specific testing thresholds for each 
physician, and as a result we cannot disentangle cohort and experience effects. Our finding 
stands in contrast to the result in Cutler et al. (2013) that older physicians are more likely to 
recommend agressive treatment for cardiac patients. One explanation for this difference may 
be that older physicians were trained before the broad diffusion of modern CT scans which 
are used to diagnose PE, and so may be more likely to rule out pulmonary embolism on the 
basis of clinical presentaation.
Many factors predicted to influence care quality, such as the quality of the physician’s 
training, the financial structure of the hospital (for profit or otherwise), its status as an 
academic institution, and the income of the patients served, have no significant relationship 
to testing thresholds. Estimates relating physician’s medical school rank to testing thresholds 
18The FGLS estimates are based on Lewis and Linzer (2005), where the error term consists of both a homoskedastic εid with 
unknown variance and a heteroskedastic component with known variance. The heteroskedastic component arises from the estimation 
error in  which is in turn recovered from estimation of equation 14.
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are imprecisely estimated, with the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval at a 1.2 
percentage point higher threshold for those attending a top 50 research institution. Point 
estimates suggest slightly higher thresholds for academic hospitals and lower thresholds 
among for-profit hospitals, but the 95% confidence intervals bound the differences in 
average thresholds to less than one percentage point.
Finally, exploiting cross-sectional variation in enactment of tort reform, including joint and 
several liability and malpractice damage caps, we find no consistent relationship between the 
malpractice environment and testing thresholds. The FGLS estimates point to a significant, 
negative relationship between testing thresholds and malpractice damage caps, which would 
be the opposite prediction of theory suggesting physicians are more likely to test low-risk 
patients in states with damage caps. The coefficient is much smaller in magnitude and no 
longer statistically significant in the OLS specification. Our lack of power to estimate year-
specific testing thresholds precludes us from undertaking a difference-in-differences analysis 
of malpractice law.
Given the large estimated variation in τd, with a standard deviation of 0.054 after adjusting 
for statistical noise, observed factors can explain only a small fraction of the estimated 
variation in physician practice style. This observation implies that policy responses targeted 
at reducing testing rates in specific hospital types (e.g. for profit hospitals) or policies aimed 
at raising the qualifications of emergency department doctors are unlikely to lead to 
substantial reductions in testing variation. Instead, focusing on policies which target the 
decision-making process rather than physician credentials or practice environment may have 
greater scope for reducing heterogeneity in practice style. This parallels the finding in the 
teacher fixed effects literature that there is substantial variation in teacher productivity not 
explained by teacher credentials or other observable factors (Jackson et al. 2014).
5.2 Identifying misweighted comorbidities
Next, we explore physicians’ misweighting of observable PE risk factors. As outlined in 
section 4.2, we focus on measuring aggregate misweighting: factors which appear to be 
systemically under- or over-weighted in physicians’ assessments of patient PE risk. The 
model implies that physicians are overweighting a given risk factor if they are substantially 
more likely to test a patient with that factor (holding constant other observable patient 
characteristics), but this variable does not yield a commensurate increase in the rate of 
positive tests among tested patients. The evidence of both under- and over-weighting 
suggests that physicians could perform the same total number of tests but detect more PE 
cases, if they improved targeting of the tests by applying different weights to important risk 
factors.
Results are reported in Table 4 and Appendix Table A.2. For each risk factor in our model, 
column 1 reports the marginal effect of this variable on testing probability based on the 
coefficient β′ from the testing equation (cf. equation 5). Column 2 reports the estimated 
error in physicians’ assessment of the PE risk associated with each comorbidity, implied by 
how the weights attached to each comorbidity in their testing decisions compare to the 
conditional influence of each comorbidity on test outcomes (cf. equation 13). Finally, 
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columns 3 and 4 report the standard error and t-statistic on estimated misweighting, 
respectively. Variables are sorted by their t-statistic in this table.
Given our nonlinear model, the reported marginal effects in column 1 hold for all patients 
for whom , which is true for the average patient in our data. (Marginal effects are zero 
for patients with negative values of .) All included risk factors are binary variables; 
variables with the most misweighting will have the largest absolute value of misweighting 
reported in column 2. We report robust standard errors that don’t account for estimation 
error in the testing propensity index , although this adjustment would be very small given 
the large sample of patients identifying .
We find evidence of substantial under- and over-weighting of key risk factors, relative to the 
weights that would maximize test yields. Comparing physician’s implied prediction of PE 
risk for each patient with the estimated actual risk, we find that physicians appear to be 
misestimating a patient’s probability of a positive test by 2.3 percentage points on average, 
accounting for all comorbidities and averaging the absolute value of each patient’s aggregate 
misweighting to include both under- and over-estimates. This degree of misestimation has 
the potential to affect testing decisions for many patients.
Investigating the specific conditions that drive the aggregate misweighting, we find that 
doctors appear to react strongly to patients’ clinical symptoms, overtesting patients with 
clinical conditions that may mimic the symptoms of PE, while discounting the importance of 
known PE risk factors from the patient’s medical history. We cannot distinguish in this 
setting whether the apparent overattention to symptoms rather than comorbidities is driven 
by inadequate information in the emergency care context about patient’s medical history or 
by mistaken beliefs about the PE risk associated with each factor. Future research could 
study whether high quality electronic medical records mitigate this problem by providing 
timely information about relevant medical history or whether tailored decision support might 
help guide physicians’ assessment of patient PE risk.
The strongest evidence of underweighting comes from physicians’ implicit estimate of the 
PE risk associated with a recent inpatient admission history. While immobilization is a 
commonly known risk factor for PE, popular risk scores highlight the role of recent surgery 
but do not broadly include other types of hospitalization. Perhaps as a result, we see 
evidence that physicians have adequately increased testing rates for patients with a recent 
surgical history, but do not place sufficient weight on recent hospital admissions that did not 
include a surgical procedure. The marginal effect reports that physicians are 0.9 percentage 
points less likely to test a patient with a prior inpatient admission within the past 30 days, 
implying that doctors have underestimated these patients’ PE risk by 11 percentage points 
after accounting for the role of other observed comorbidities.
In addition, several specific cancer diagnoses and a history of PE or the related condition 
deep vein thrombosis show evidence of substantial underweighting, suggesting that 
physicians are failing to adequately consider these risks when assessing a patient for PE.19 
For all but one of these conditions (metastatic cancer), physicians are indeed more likely to 
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test patients with the observed condition, holding constant other patient risk factors, but the 
response is not adequate given the large influence of this preexisting condition on the current 
risk for PE. This pattern is occurring despite the fact that both cancer treatment and history 
of PE or deep vein thrombosis are two of the seven risk factors in a popular PE risk-scoring 
algorithm known as the Wells score. This suggests that physicians are continuing to under-
respond to these critical risk factors despite their recognized role in PE risk.20
A few other risk factors also show evidence of significant underweighting, including 
rheumatoid arthritis, obesity and paralysis, all of which are known risk factors for PE 
documented in the medical literature, although not explicitly included in popular risk scoring 
algorithms. A complete list of underweighted risk factors is reported in the top panel of 
Table 4.
A number of different conditions that mimic the symptoms of PE appear on the list of over-
weighted comrbidities: these are conditions where test yields are predicted to improve if 
physicians became less likely to test patients with these particular conditions. The three 
conditions with the most significant evidence of overweighting (i.e. atrial fibrillation, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and ischemic heart disease), have chest pain and 
difficulty breathing as hallmark symptoms; these are also key clinical symptoms of PE. 
Severe depression often manifests in the emergency department context with somatic 
symptoms of chest pain and shortness of breath as well. Patients who visit the emergency 
department with an exacerbation of another previously diagnosed condition could be 
suspected of having PE due to similar symptoms and thus may be tested at a higher rate even 
though our data suggests they are not at higher risk of PE, holding constant their other risk 
factors. Given that these other conditions must have been diagnosed prior to the emergency 
department visit in order to be included on our comorbidity list, physicians should be aware 
of them at the time they are evaluating the patient for PE. Of course, failure to take an 
appropriate medical history or limited access to patients’ prior health records could hinder 
evaluation and contribute to the observed overweighting of these conditions.
Turning to demographic variables, we find evidence that black patients are under-tested. 
They are less likely to be tested for PE than non-black patients, despite the fact that they are 
at higher risk of PE. Given the structure of our model, these differences in testing patterns of 
black and white patients cannot be explained by differential sorting to physicians, since we 
have controlled for differences in physicians’ testing thresholds. This finding provides new 
empirical support for the concern about racial disparities and possible provider prejudice in 
medical treatment (cf. Nelson 2002). The result stands in contrast to results from Chandra 
and Staiger (2010) that applied a related analytic framework to a different clinical setting 
and found that while blacks receive less treatment for heart attacks, differences were fully 
explained by their lower benefits from treatment. In the setting of testing for PE, differences 
19Prostate cancer, metastatic cancer, endometrial cancer and colorectal cancer all have significant underweighting.
20Whether the underweighting of these risk factors is driven by failure to adhere to Wells’ score criteria or whether the Wells score 
inadequately weights these risks is not something we can directly assess in our data. Complete calculation of the Wells’ score would 
require information that is difficult to observe in claims data or even retrospective study of patient charts. For example, the most highly 
weighted factor in the score is the physician’s clinical opinion that PE is the most likely diagnosis, or equally likely to the other 
possible diagnosis.
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in test yields do not explain disparities in testing rates. Notably, these disparities are arising 
among patients who have all arrived at the emergency department for evaluation by a 
physician with access to a CT scanner, and all carry Medicare insurance coverage, although 
they may differ in their subscription to wrap-around private insurance.
Taken together, these results suggest that misassessments of the clinical risk associated with 
preexisting comorbidities may lead to substantially diminished test yields. It is possible that 
physicians could detect more PE cases while performing a similar number of tests, by 
adjusting the targeting.
An alternative explanation for these patterns of apparent misweighting would be that the 
value of detecting PE differs for patients with these varying risk factors. For example, if the 
value of detecting PE were substantially lower in patients with a recent hospital admission or 
a cancer diagnosis, that could explain the apparent underweighting. Conversely, if the value 
of detecting PE were higher for patients with ischemic heart disease, COPD or atrial 
fibrillation, then that could also help rationalize the observed testing behavior. We find no 
obvious link between most of these conditions and the value of PE detection. In fact, our 
results on age-related risk suggests that physicians are undertesting younger patients, for 
whom the value of PE detection should be particularly high, since they have a longer life 
expectancy and accordingly higher value of statistical life. One exception in which a lower 
value of treatment may explain the observed results is Alzheimer’s disease; this appears in 
our list of underweighted conditions, but may reflect the lower value of treating pulmonary 
embolism among patients with this severe, progressive disease.
5.3 The impact of threshold variation and misweighting on test yields
To quantify the role that testing thresholds and misweighting play in the observed patterns of 
testing behavior and test yields, we return to the graph of physician testing rates and test 
yields. Now, rather than binning physicians by the average fraction of patients tested as we 
did in Figure 2, we bin physicians by the structural analogue: the average estimated testing 
propensity  across their patients. Recall the observation from the reduced form analysis in 
section 3.4 that physicians with the highest average testing rates also had the lowest test 
yields. This downward sloping relationship is what we would expect to find if heterogeneity 
in τd were the primary driver of observed variation in testing rates across doctors.
We can explore this hypothesis more formally by using our model to simulate what the 
relationship between average physician testing propensities and positive test rates would 
have been if all doctors had the same testing threshold. We simulate testing decisions and 
test outcomes under a counterfactual where τd is held constant across doctors, at the 
estimated average value E(τd) = 0.056. Details of this simulation are provided in Appendix 
G.
Results of this exercise are pictured in Figure 3. The open circles depict the downward 
sloping relationship between physicians’ average testing propensities and their test yields in 
our observed data. As we suggested earlier, if all doctors had the same testing threshold, the 
remaining variation in doctors’ average testing propensities would be driven by differences 
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in patient risk of PE. As a result, the relationship between doctors’ average testing 
propensities and their test yields would become upward sloping over most of the domain. 
The solid square markers display the results of this simulation in Figure 3. Now the doctors 
with higher testing rates are those with the highest risk patients; these doctors test the 
greatest fraction of their patients and experience the highest test yields, as evidenced by the 
upward slope in the simulated plot.21
Finally, we investigate how misweighting impacts this relationship between testing 
propensity and test yields. We simulate the counterfactual relationship between physicians’ 
average testing propensities and test yields that would be observed if there were no 
heterogeneity in testing thresholds and no misweighting of observable risk factors. 
Eliminating misweighting should increase the test yield for all values of the testing 
propensity index by improving the targeting of PE CT tests. Details of the simulation 
exercise are described in Appendix G.
Results of this simulation are pictured in Figure 3 and plotted with the X-shaped markers. 
We see that for every decile of physicians’ average testing propensity, the predicted test yield 
is higher in the simulation with no misweighting than was observed in both our actual data 
or the simulation that only eliminated threshold variation. We predict more detected positive 
tests if physicians attached appropriate weights to observable risk factors, and the increase is 
largest at lower testing propensities. (We quantify the precise increase in test yields and their 
welfare consequences in section 7.3.) Inframarginal patients are likely to be tested even with 
misweighting, but the set of marginal patients changes—some patients who are less likely to 
test positive are no longer tested and others who were previously not tested but have a higher 
likelihood of testing positive are now tested. This exercise suggests that misweighting is a 
substantial contributor to low test yields, and attention to better targeting of testing resources 
is warranted, rather than focusing solely on reducing variation in testing rates.
6 Robustness
The results discussed in the previous sections depend on a number of modeling assumptions. 
Two crucial assumptions underly our identification arguments: first, that we can identify 
marginal tested patients and use their test yields to reveal physician’s test thresholds; second, 
that the restrictions we assume for the ηid term, the factors influencing testing choices that 
are observable to the doctor but unobservable to the econometrician, are valid. In our 
baseline specification, we assume that ηid is i.i.d. across patients and doctors and follows a 
specific parametric distribution. In the robustness checks described below, we test the 
sensitivity of our results to these assumptions. Specifically, we consider the robustness of 
our results to varying the set of included covariates and the definition of the marginal tested 
patients; we estimate a version of our model where the variance of ηid is allowed to vary 
21If we graphed testing propensities vs. simulated rates of positive tests at the individual patient level, fixing τd = E(τd), our model 
implies that the resulting relationship would be monotonic. Because we are aggregating to the physician level in the figure, this 
relationship also depends on the variance in testing propensities for a given physician; the slight non-monotonicity at the lowest 
deciles arises because doctors with the lowest average testing propensities have more heterogeneous patients (driven by variation in 
observed comorbidities xid) than those in adjacent deciles. At these low average testing propensities, higher variance in Iid is 
associated with more positive tests amongst tested patients due to the convexity of the relationship between Iid and positive testing 
rates at the individual level.
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flexibly across doctors; and we estimate a semiparametric model where ηid is once again 
assumed to be homoskedastic but now with an arbitrary distribution.
6.1 Stability of results to inclusion of alternate patient controls
In the spirit of Altonji et al. (2008), we explore the sensitivity of our results to the set of 
included variables to assess potential bias from unobservable risk factors. The rationale for 
this exercise is that omitting the variables  from the baseline specification could 
generate heteroskedasticity, if the resulting error term  is not independently 
and identically distributed across doctors and patients. If this heteroskedasticity substantially 
changes our estimates of the distribution of τd or the degree of misweighting for the 
remaining variables, this might suggest that including additional unobserved variables would 
change our estimates further.
Recall that we rely on comorbidities to identify the patients the doctor is just indifferent 
between testing and not testing, and then calculate test outcomes among that group to 
identify thresholds for physicians with marginal patients. In addition to testing robustness to 
heteroskedasticity in the error term, varying the set of included variables will also change the 
set of patients identified as marginal (i.e. just barely worth testing given their physician’s 
threshold). As we remove comorbidities from the analysis, we are less able to isolate the 
marginal patients and may include more inframarginal patients in the group used to identify 
doctor’s testing thresholds. To show exactly how varying the definition of marginal patients 
impacts the analysis separately from heteroskedasticity, we also consider explicitly varying 
our threshold quantile for which patients count as marginal.
The baseline model reported above included four main classes of patient level risk factors: 
PE specific risk factors, chronic condition warehouse comorbidities, Elixhauser 
comorbidities, and patient demographic variables. Because some variation in comorbidities 
is required to appropriately identify this model, we retain the PE specific risk factors and the 
chronic condition warehouse comoribidities throughout, and test the stability of our findings 
to excluding the Elixhauser comorbidity set and the vector of demographic variables. Results 
from this exercise are reported in Table 5; the empirical Bayes correction has been applied 
before reporting the mean and standard deviation of physician’s testing thresholds.
The mean estimated value of physician’s testing thresholds ranges between 5.6% and 6.6%, 
and shows evidence of substantial dispersion in all models. The standard deviation of τd 
ranges between 3.9% and 5.4%, depending on the set of included patient risk factors. 
Dropping covariates does appear to increase the value of the estimated mean τd although the 
range of values across specifications is only one quarter of the estimated across-doctor 
standard deviation. If including additional covariates would cause estimates of τd to 
decrease, this suggests that our results may be conservative with respect to the amount of 
overtesting. Controlling for the full set of risk factors also appears to increase the variance in 
estimated testing thresholds, providing suggestive evidence that the observed variation in 
thresholds is not driven by the exclusion of unobserved risk factors from the model. In all of 
these cases, variation in testing thresholds is sufficient to imply large differences in testing 
probabilities for identical patients depending on which doctor they visit.
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It is not surprising that the mean τd increases when we exclude covariates. When we exclude 
comorbidities from the sample, we make it more difficult to identify accurately the marginal 
tested patients, and may end up including more non-marginal patients in this calculation. 
These non-marginal tested patients will have higher average test yields, and so will push up 
our estimated test thresholds. To examine more directly the sensitivity of our results to the 
definition of marginal patients, we explicitly vary this definition in Appendix Table A.1. We 
include all the baseline covariates but vary the quantile of the testing propensity cutoff below 
which patients are defined as marginal. Less stringent definitions of marginal patients than in 
our baseline results recover a larger average value of the physician threshold as predicted 
and more stringent definitions recover a lower value, suggesting our results are conservative 
with respect to the degree of overtesting to the extent that with more data (or more 
covariates) we could better identify those patients who were truly marginal.
All specifications also predict substantial misweighting of included risk factors. The average 
absolute value of misweighting in physicians’ assessment of PE risk ranges from 0.020 to 
0.023 percentage points. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the full model which includes all available 
risk factors as candidate sources of misweighting recovers the largest predicted amount of 
misweighting. In all cases, misweighting is sufficiently large that it has the potential to 
change testing decisions for many marginal patients. Appendix Table A.1 reports that 
varying the definition of marginal patients also does not change the estimated misperception 
of PE risk.
In results reported in Appendix Table A.3, we find that the specific misweighted factors 
identified in Table 4 and discussed in section 5.2 continue to show evidence of misweighting 
of similar direction and magnitude, even as we vary the set of other included comorbidities. 
For example, the PE risk associated with recent hospital admissions and history of PE or 
deep vein thrombosis appears significantly underweighted in all specifications; black 
patients also show evidence of being under-tested in both specifications that include 
demographic variables. Similarly, a consistent set of conditions shows evidence of 
overweighting across specifications, including ischemic heart disease, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease and atrial fibrillation. These findings are not sensitive to the choice of 
other included covariates.
6.2 Estimation with physician-specific heteroskedasticity
Even if our results are not sensitive to dropping some covariates, we might worry that PE 
risk factors we cannot observe from insurance claims vary systematically across doctors. 
Differences across doctors in the variance of ηid could arise for at least three reasons. First, 
doctors may differ in their skill at assessing risk factors unobservable to the econometrician. 
A doctor with more diagnostic skill may have a higher variance in ηid across his patients, 
since he is more discerning in his judgement of which patients should be tested on the basis 
of clinical presentation and symptoms. Second, doctors may differ in the variance of latent 
PE risk present in their patient population. A doctor with a more heterogeneous patient 
population may have a higher variance in ηid across his patients. Finally, doctors may simply 
make “errors” that lead them to deviate from typical practice patterns; a doctor who 
frequently deviates from his peers’ practice patterns in assessing PE risk may have have a 
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higher variance in ηid. The model we develop in this section allows us to isolate differences 
in physician testing thresholds that are unrelated to possible differences in the variance of 
ηid across physicians.
Recall the assumption we made in Section 4.4 that ηid followed a mixture of a Bernoulli and 
uniform distribution. We maintain the basic shape of the distribution but now allow both the 
Bernoulli probability and the variance of the uniform distribution to vary across doctors, so 
that ηid ~ U(−ηd, ηd) with probability 1 − pd and ηid ~ U[υ − ηd, υ + ηd] with probability 
pd.
Following the derivation in Appendix E, the more flexible distributional assumption implies 
the testing equation takes this form:
(15)
From the testing equation above, we can see that heteroskedasticity in ηid is identified by the 
fact that observables are less predictive of testing behavior for doctors with a high variance 
in ηid, i.e. a smaller value of . As described in the appendix, the testing equation can be 
used to estimate , where C is an unknown scaling constant. For computational 
tractability given the demands of this more flexible estimation strategy, we randomly 
exclude half of the physicians from our sample to reduce sample size, and drop the 
Elixhauser comorbidities and demographic risk factors from our list of included covariates.
With the introduction of heteroskedasticity, the conditional probability of a positive test is 
given by:
(16)
where  are the variances estimated in the testing equation. Further details of the 
estimation strategy are provided in Appendix E.
Table 5 reports the results of this analysis in panel 4, which can be compared to results from 
the baseline model with the same excluded comorbidity set, as reported in panel 3. The 
mean value of physicians’ test thresholds τd is slightly higher at 7.0% in the model allowing 
for heteroskedasticity compared to 6.6% in the baseline model with the same covariates. 
Estimates of the standard deviation of τd are are also higher at 5.1 percentage points in the 
heteroskedastic model compared to 3.9 percentage points in the homoskedastic model. Thus, 
the cross-physician variation in testing behavior is not explained by differences in the 
variance of ηid across doctors. This provides reassuring evidence that the assumption of 
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homoskedasticity in the baseline model was not leading us to overstate differences across 
physicians in testing thresholds. Finally, the degree of misweighting remains very similar to 
the original estimates, with the average absolute value of misweighting estimated at 0.021 in 
the heteroskedastic model compared to 0.020 in the baseline model.
The role of physician diagnostic judgment in driving testing behavior and outcomes was 
previously explored by Doyle, Ewer, and Wagner (2010). In a natural experiment, they find 
that physicians from more prestigious residency programs achieve similar patient outcomes 
at 10–25% lower cost compared to their less skilled peers. One potential explanation for this 
phenomenon is that physicians from less prestigious schools prefer to administer more low-
value care and could achieve the same outcomes at lower cost if they cut back some services. 
In the language of our model, these less skilled physicians might have lower testing 
thresholds, i.e. smaller τd. A second explanation is that these less skilled physicians just 
need to use more medical resources to achieve the same quality of care, because they are less 
accurate in their assessments of ex ante patient risk. In the language of our model, this 
decreased diagnostic accuracy would correspond to a lower variance of ηid, since these less 
skilled physicians would be failing to incorporate clinical information about patient risk to 
improve test targeting. Our results suggest that the heterogeneity in measured τd across 
physicians persists even after allowing for heterogeneous variance of ηid acoss doctors. This 
finding raises the possibility that cost variance across physicians is driven in part by lower 
marginal value services provided by doctors with lower expected benefit thresholds.
6.3 Estimation of a semiparametric selection model
Next we test whether our results are sensitive to the shape of the distribution assumed for the 
unobserved component of patient PE risk, ηid. We previously imposed a strict distributional 
assumption, requiring ηid to be distributed according to a mixture of Bernoulli and Uniform 
distributions. Now, we relax this assumption by estimating Equation 11 as a semiparametric 
binary choice model, using the Klein and Spady (1993) binary choice estimator. This 
robustness exercise will ensure that differences in testing thresholds observed in the previous 
sections are not driven solely by the strong distributional assumptions which restricted the 
functional form of the testing equation and the shape of the selection correction function 
λ(·). To implement the semiparametric model, we return to our original, strong version of 
the ignorability assumption that ηid is i.i.d. across physicians and patients.
Estimation of the semiparametric model proceeds as follows. Let g denote the probability 
that patient i is tested given index . The log likelihood is given by:
(17)
The idea of the Klein-Spady estimator is to approximate g using a “leave-one-out” estimator 
which predicts the probability of testing for a particular patient, giving more weight to 
patients with nearby indices . Specifically, we substitute for g using the following 
function:
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(18)
We use a 4th-order Gaussian Kernel, k(·), and empirically select for the smallest bandwidth 
h such that g is a monotonic function of the index .
Given the propensity to test index  from estimating equation 11 by the Klein-Spady 
procedure, the next step is to estimate the testing outcome equation. Echoing the derivation 
in Section 4.2, the probability of a positive test among tested patients is given by:
(19)
where . Because we no longer assume a particular distribution of ηid, 
we now fit the function λ(·) flexibly, reporting results with λ(·) as a linear function and as a 
cubic polynomial, and estimate the net benefit equation by OLS.
Note that the Klein-Spady estimator only recovers  up to a location and scale 
normalization. The scale normalization is embedded in the function λ(·). We impose the 
appropriate location normalization so that at the smallest value of  among tested patients, 
, we have  as shown in Section 4.3.22
Estimation of the semiparametric model is quite computationally intensive, and as a result, 
we maintain the restricted sample size and covariate set also used in the estimation of the 
heteroskedastic model in the previous section. Each time we construct the likelihood 
function, we need to construct a jackknife estimate for each observation which is a weighted 
average across all other observations given our kernel and bandwidth. This is nested within 
an optimization problem in which we estimate the parameters of our model for a given 
bandwidth. We then iterate the entire procedure, searching over for the smallest bandwidth 
that gives a monotonic result.
Results of the semiparametric estimation are reported in Table 5, panels 5 and 6. This 
semiparametric estimation approach estimates the mean value of τd at 6.7% (linear) or 6.6% 
(cubic), similar to the parametric model estimate of 6.6% in the sample with identical 
comorbidities. We continue to find a large amount of cross-doctor dispersion in estimated 
testing thresholds. The standard deviation of τd is 5.4% across doctors, compared to 3.9% in 
22This normalization can be implemented by omitting the constant term from the polynomial λ(·) and subtracting a constant  from 
 ; thus the resulting polynomial  will equal 0 for . To avoid sensitivity to outliers, we normalize  so that 
 for  in the 10th percentile amongst tested patients, which agrees with our definition of marginal patients in Section 4.3.
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the parametric model with the same covariates (but interestingly nearly identical to the 
parametric model with the full set of covariates included). Our assessment of misweighting 
continues to be highly consistent across models, with an average absolute value of the error 
due to misweighting at 2.1% in the semiparametric model, compared to 2.0% in the 
parametric model.
Taken together, these robustness checks, including varying the set of included covariates, 
allowing for physician-specific heteroskedasticity, and estimating a semiparametric selection 
model, all suggest that our findings on the dispersion in testing thresholds and amount of 
misweighting are very stable across alternative modeling assumptions. We find substantial 
variance in testing thresholds of similar magnitude in all specifications, suggesting that 
much of the observed variation in testing behavior may be driven by differences in practice 
styles. Further, doctors are misassessing patient PE risk by similar amounts in percentage 
point terms across all models.
7 Welfare cost of overtesting and misweighting
We now turn to the welfare implications of the models estimated in the previous sections. In 
order to assess the welfare cost of overtesting and misweighting, we will need to make 
additional assumptions about the costs of testing and the dollar-equivalent benefits of 
detecting and treating a PE. Given these assumptions, we can evaluate whether the observed 
variation in testing thresholds reflects overuse and compare the welfare cost of overuse to 
the welfare cost of misweighting. Applying the structure and estimates of our baseline 
estimation procedure, we perform simulations to determine how welfare would change if 
doctors behaved optimally from a social standpoint. We begin by simulating worlds with no 
overtesting but maintaining the observed patterns of misweighting; next, we simulate a 
world with no misweighting but maintain the observed distribution of testing thresholds. In 
each case, we decompose the sources of estimated welfare gains into financial costs, medical 
costs and medical benefits.
This section proceeds first by describing the calibration of the optimal testing threshold τ*, 
then exploring the welfare implications of the measured variation in physician testing 
thresholds, and finally estimating the welfare costs of misweighting the PE risk associated 
with patient comorbidities. All of the calibrations in this section are implemented in our 
baseline model as outlined and reported in Sections 4 and 5.
7.1 Calibration of parameters
In order to proceed with welfare calculations, we make several additional assumptions about 
the costs of testing and the benefits of a positive test. We assess these costs and benefits from 
a social standpoint; e.g. if some physicians test more due to reimbursement incentives, this 
would appear in our model as measured heterogeneity in τd that deviates from the social 
optimum we compute below.
If physicians are behaving optimally, they should test a patient if and only if: NUqid − c > 0 
where NU represents the net utility of detecting a positive test, c represents the cost of the 
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test and as above, qid denotes the likelihood of a positive test. This yields a socially optimal 
testing threshold  such that physicians should test only if qid > τ*.
If there were no false positive or false negative tests, the net utility would correspond to the 
net medical benefits of treating PE minus any financial costs of treatment. However, CT 
scans, like many other medical tests, can generate both false positive and false negative 
results (Stein et al. 2006). It turns out that an important cost of overtesting is a consequence 
of type I and type II errors: overtesting leads to unneeded treatment which can have adverse 
consequences. Patients with false positive test results receive medical treatment as if they 
truly had a PE; this treatment will incur medical risks and financial costs without conferring 
any medical benefit on the patient, since they do not truly have the condition being treated.
Let fp denote the likelihood of a false positive, s the sensitivity of the test (one minus the 
probability of a false negative), MB the medical benefits of treating a PE, MC the medical 
costs and CT the financial costs of treatment. In Appendix H, we show that allowing for 
false positives and false negatives results in a model which is isomorphic to the one above 
with NU replaced by  and c replaced by .
Table 6 reports the values of the parameters that we use to compute . Parameters 
specifying test sensitivity and specificity, the medical benefits of testing, and the medical 
costs of testing are drawn from the existing medical literature. Note that our calibration of 
both the medical benefits and the medical cost of treatment depend on an estimate of the 
value of a statistical life (VSL); following Murphy and Topel (2006) we assume a VSL of $1 
million.23 We estimate the financial cost of testing and the financial cost of PE treatment 
directly from our Medicare claims data. Appendix Table A.5, which we discuss below, 
explores the sensitivity of our welfare findings to these calibration parameters.
One parameter of this calibration turns out to be of particular importance and remains a 
source of uncertainty in the medical literature: the rate of false positive tests. To our 
knowledge, the single piece of medical evidence on chest CT scans’ false positive rate 
derives from a comparison of CT imaging results to older diagnostic methods, VQ scanning 
and ultrasonography; the authors estimate the false positive rate at 4% (Stein et al. 2006). 
We report results with a false positive rate of 4% as our preferred welfare calibration, but 
also show the welfare implications of assuming a 3% or 0% false positive rate. Lower false 
positive rates boost the net utility associated with treating a positive test, and thus provide 
more conservative estimates of the costs of overtesting.
Table 7 reports the optimal testing threshold τ* under these calibration assumptions. With a 
false positive rate of 4%, we find physicians should optimally test all patients with an ex 
ante likelihood of a positive test greater than or equal to 6.2%. The optimal threshold 
23The choice of a lower VSL estimate in this context is driven by the fact that we are studying an elderly population, with an average 
age of around 77.
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decreases to 5.0% at a false positive rate of 3%; at the (unlikely) extreme of no false positive 
test results, the optimal threshold falls to 1.5%.
7.2 Welfare impact of eliminating overtesting
The model implies welfare loss whenever a physician’s testing threshold τd does not equal 
the optimal value τ*. We focus on the welfare consequences of overtesting, where τd is 
below this calibrated optimum, for two reasons. First, overtesting is empirically the larger 
problem in our sample, with an estimated 84% of doctors overtesting under our preferred 
calibration assumptions. Second, unlike the overtesting case, we find that the welfare loss 
due to under-testing is highly dependent on the distribution we assume for τd when applying 
an empirical Bayes technique to recover the posterior distribution of τd. Previously, we were 
agnostic about the distribution of τd and recovered only the posterior mean and variance, but 
for welfare calculations, a specific distributional assumption is required. For some 
distributions of τd, even a small number of doctors under-testing can lead to large welfare 
losses if the right tail of the τd distribution is sufficiently thick.
To determine the percentage of doctors overtesting we need to extend our empirical Bayes 
analysis to recover a posterior estimate of τd for each physician; proceeding requires an 
assumption about the shape of the underlying τd distribution. First, note that τd is bounded 
below at the false positive rate. We assume that τd minus the false positive rate is log-
normally distributed with the posterior mean and variance of the τd distribution as 
previously calculated. Table 7 reports the percentage of doctors overtesting at each false 
positive rate, given this distributional assumption.
Our initial estimates of τd are in units of the probability of a positive test. For example, in 
our baseline specification, we find that the average doctor tests a patient if the probability of 
a positive test exceeds 5.6%. We want to know: how would testing behavior change for each 
physician if all physicians with testing thresholds below τ* = 6.2% instead adopted a 
threshold of 6.2%? If we observed qid for each patient, this would be a simple matter of 
counting the number of inframarginal patients. But qid is not observed—instead, we know 
the probability of a positive test as a function of the propensity to test. Our model allows us 
to determine how changes in τd impact the propensity to test using the scaling factor , the 
estimated coefficient on the selection term in equation 14. Equation 14 also allows us to 
compute how the probability of a positive test conditional on testing changes for each 
observation. More details are provided in Appendix H.
Combined with our assumptions about costs and net utility, we compute separately the 
realized medical benefits of testing, the medical costs of testing, the financial costs of testing 
and the net benefits of testing given the estimated  as well as a counterfactual where τd = 
τ* for all doctors with . These results are shown in Table 7, under a series of different 
assumptions about the false positive rate.
At a false positive rate of 4% (the estimate in the medical literature), we estimate that 84% 
of the physicians in our sample are overtesting on the margin, i.e. they apply a testing 
threshold that is lower than the 6.2% threshold probability of a positive test the calibration 
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suggests is optimal. At a false positive rate of 3%, the proportion of doctors overtesting falls 
to 67.2%. To illustrate the importance of the false positive rate in assessing welfare, note that 
if there were no false positive tests, the optimal testing threshold τ* drops substantially to 
1.5% and only 10% of physicians are overtesting on the margin, i.e. have a testing threshold 
lower than 1.5%.
At a false positive rate of 3% or 4%, eliminating overtesting would decrease the total 
number of patients tested by more than 30% or 50%, respectively. Why such large effects? 
Recall that with a false positive rate of 4%, the minimum possible perceived probability (qid) 
of a positive test is 4%. The median physician in our sample has a τd which is less than 5% 
(much less than the mean, since the distribution is bounded from below by 4%). Increasing 
τd to 6.2% thus greatly increases the range of probabilities qid which would not be tested for 
many physicians.
In these scenarios, the financial and medical costs of testing would fall by an amount 
proportional to the decline in tested patients. There would be a small offsetting decline in the 
medical benefits of testing because the patients not tested in the counterfactual world have a 
very low probability of truly having a PE. Eliminating overtesting leads to a 12.5% increase 
in net benefits at a false positive rate of 3% and a more than 60% increase in net benefits at a 
false positive rate of 4%; the increase in net benefits per test is of course much larger. This 
exercise illustrates both the large welfare implications of overuse of medical testing and the 
sensitivity of this result to the false positive rate. As detailed in Table 7, most of the net 
benefit increase comes from eliminating the financial costs associated with testing low-
probability patients for PE and unneeded treatment of patients with false positive test results.
Given the widespread incidence of overtesting under our preferred calibration, it is worth 
considering a few possible explanations. As we illustrate in Table 7, the estimated 
overtesting behavior of a majority of doctors in our sample could be explained if they were 
behaving as if there were no false positive test results. Similarly, if physicians ignored the 
financial costs associated with testing and treating PE, this could also explain much of the 
overtesting behavior. However, the only way to rationalize the entire estimated posterior 
distribution of physician testing patterns would be to allow physicians to vary substantially 
in their assessment of financial costs or the false positive rate.
One could also interpret variation in τd as variation in the patients’ “value of knowing” that 
they do not have a PE. In contrast to the case of Huntington’s disease (Oster, Shoulson, and 
Dorsey 2011), the value of knowing seems an unlikely driver of testing decisions in this 
context, since in most cases a PE has a very low ex ante probability and the rate of false 
negatives is sufficiently high that even after testing one has only somewhat reduced that 
probability. Further, Finkelstein et al. (2014) find that variation in patient demand (i.e. both 
patient preferences and medical needs) explains only 14% of the regional variation in 
spending on imaging, suggesting a very limited role for patient preferences in explaining 
variation in imaging decisions.
Finally, the socially optimal testing threshold depends on the cost of scanning a patient, 
which we estimate directly from the Medicare claims data. The $300 financial cost of testing 
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is calculated based on the allowed charges which compensate for the technician’s time to run 
the scan, the radiologist’s time to interpret the scan and capital depreciation. If some of this 
reimbursement is intended as compensation for the high fixed costs of owning a CT scanner, 
then we may be overstating the social cost of testing. We believe this concern is mitigated by 
calculating costs directly from the Medicare data, where reimbursement for CT scans 
remains much below the estimated fees paid by privately insured consumers (cf. Healthcare 
Blue Book which estimates the typical fee at $517 to $577 depending on the precise billing 
code). In addition, there may be opportunity costs of scanning a patient not accounted for in 
our calibration if the hospital is capacity constrained in its allocation of time in the CT 
scanner or time spent awaiting a scan in an ED bed. If present, opportunity costs would lead 
us to understate the true costs of performing a scan, and thus understate the amount of 
overtesting in our data.
Panel A of Table A.5 explores how our results on the net welfare cost of overtesting vary 
with the calibrated parameters. The results do not vary much with the calibration of test 
sensitivity. Changing either the VSL or the cost of the test shifts the optimal testing 
threshold τ* and thus the welfare benefits. For example, with a VSL of $500,000 rather than 
$1 million, the optimal threshold increases from 6.2% to 14.3%. Due to this dramatic 
increase in τ*, simulations with no physicians overtesting involve more dramatic declines in 
the fraction of patients tested, and the net benefits of eliminating overtesting almost double 
vis-a-vis the baseline calibration results. If the VSL is $1.5 million rather than $1 million, 
the number of patients tested in a world with no overtesting increases by 50%, and the net 
benefits of eliminating overtesting likewise fall. Similarly, if the cost of the test is $0 (i.e. if 
there is zero marginal social cost of running a CT scan), the optimal threshold τ* falls to 
4.8%, there is substantially less overtesting and the overtesting that does occur has much 
lower social cost (only the costs from overtreatment of false positive tests). If the costs of 
treating patients with positive tests were also equal to $0, the optimal threshold τ* falls 
further to 4.3%, eliminating most over-testing but implying large amounts of under-testing. 
By contrast, if the cost of the test is $500 (comparable to the fees paid to private insurers per 
CT scan) rather than $300, the net benefits of eliminating overtesting almost double.
7.3 Welfare impact of eliminating misweighting of patient risk factors
Table 8 reports results from a simulation in which doctors select patients for testing by 
weighting observable comorbidities in the manner the model suggests would maximize 
detection of positive tests. In other words, we simulate physician behavior if they were to 
use the true weights β rather than the observed weights β′ to assess PE risk. In this 
simulation, we maintain the distribution of physician testing thresholds at their baseline 
values, so we allow for the observed patterns of under- and overtesting. We report results at 
our preferred calibration of the false positive rate, 4%; the welfare consequences of 
eliminating misweighting would be even larger at lower false positive rates.
Structurally, this exercise is very similar to the exercise where we simulate alternative values 
of τd. Our initial estimates tell us the degree of misweighting in units of the probability of a 
positive test. We want to determine how the propensity to test would differ if physicians did 
not misweight; the scaling factor  allows us to translate the estimated degree of 
Abaluck et al. Page 39
Am Econ Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 November 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
misweighting into the same units as the testing propensity and calculate the testing 
propensity and expected test outcomes if there were no misweighting. We demonstrate this 
explicitly in Appendix H.
One concern with these estimates is that even if there were zero misweighting at the true 
parameter values, a model like ours would detect some misweighting due to the presence of 
statistical noise. To deal with this, we conduct a cross-validation exercise where we estimate 
the scaling factor  and the misweighting coefficients β − β′ in one half the data (the 
“training” sample) and then conduct a simulation in the other half (the “test” sample). Test 
yields are determined by the estimated parameters in the test sample while counterfactual 
testing decisions are determined by the estimated parameters in the “training” data. These 
estimates are reported in columns 3 of Table 8. The fact that we find a nearly identical 
amount of misweighting in the test sample shows that our evaluation of misweighting costs 
is not driven by statistical noise.
We find that properly weighting observables to improve PE detection would lead the fraction 
of patients tested to increase from 3.8% to 4.3%, by moving some patients just over their 
estimated physician’s testing threshold. But by far the predominant welfare impact comes 
from the predicted increase in the rate of PE detection. The medical benefits due to treatment 
of PE nearly double and the net benefits of testing more than triple. The total welfare loss 
from misweighting ($35.9 million in our sample) is more than 4 times as large as the welfare 
loss from overtesting ($8.1 million), even in the model with the highest rate of false 
positives.
To investigate whether a small number of risk factors account for most of the observed costs 
of misweighting, we conduct an exercise where we correct the weights applied to each 
variable, one at a time. Results from this exercise with more detailed notes are reported in 
Appendix Table A.4. First, it is worth noting that in this simulated second-best world where 
physicians do not all share the optimal testing threshold τ* and where other factors are 
misweighted, correcting misweighting of a single risk factor in isolation can sometimes 
worsen total welfare; certain misweighting errors offset some of the costs associated with 
overtesting. However, in most cases, correcting a single variable’s weight weakly improves 
estimated welfare.
Correcting the weighting on 30-day inpatient admissions accounts for approximately 20% of 
the total potential gains from eliminating misweighting. Expanding the list to include the 5 
highest-impact covariates (30-day admission history, 1-week admission history, 1-year 
surgical history, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and ischemic heart disease) 
accounts for roughly 60% of the total potential gains. These covariates are both substantially 
misweighted and common enough to induce large welfare consequences.
Intuitively, given our estimates of misweighting in Section 5.2, it is not surprising that the 
welfare loss from misweighting substantially exceeds the welfare losses from overtesting. 
Several factors combine to make misweighting a more serious problem. Physicians behave 
as if they are misestimating a patient’s PE risk by 2.3 percentage points on average by 
failing to weight observable characteristics to maximize detection of positive tests. By 
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comparison, the average difference between τd and τ* for physicians who are overtesting is 
only 1.7 percentage points in the calibration with a false positive rate of 4%. The welfare 
cost of misweighting errors or suboptimal values of τd increases with the square of the 
deviation—as the bias grows, both the number of patients impacted and the average severity 
of the error among those patients increases. Further, the welfare costs of overtesting are 
bounded. The worst outcome of overtesting is that a patient is tested with no chance of 
having a PE and incurs the cost of the test (a few hundred dollars) plus the potential financial 
costs and medical risk of treatment if they receive a false positive test result. The potential 
costs of misweighting are substantially greater since you might fail to treat a patient with a 
substantial risk of death.
Panel B of Table A.5 explores how our results on the net welfare cost of misweighting vary 
with the calibrated parameters. The positive impact of misweighting on testing behavior 
does not depend on the calibration (unlike the case of overtesting, since the calibration 
determines which physicians overtest). The welfare cost of misweighting is not too sensitive 
to the false positive rate, the sensitivity of the test or the cost of the test, but it is sensitive to 
the VSL. Misweighting creates more welfare loss from undertesting than overtesting: the 
welfare costs of overtesting are bounded by the financial costs of the test plus the costs of 
treating false positive test results, while the costs of undertesting in the worst case is the 
2.5% chance of mortality from a missed PE. These latter costs are roughly proportional to 
the VSL.
Undiagnosed PE is thought to be a major public health problem, with the Office of the 
Surgeon General (2008) estimating that approximately half of PE cases are never diagnosed; 
analysis of autopsy reports have found it to be a frequently missed mortality risk. By 
improving physician assessment of patient PE risk, our model suggests that the rate of 
undiagnosed PE could fall substantially. Although there is policy attention in the medical 
community on the risks associated with the perceived overuse of PE CT, this evidence 
suggests that there may be even larger gains possible from improving the targeting of CT 
scans.
Our welfare calculations are based on a 20% sample of patients enrolled in Medicare Parts A 
and B over a 10-year period, and the numbers reported in Tables 7 and 8 reflect potential 
gains to this sample only. To understand the annual welfare loss for Medicare patients 
associated with the inefficiencies we identify in this sample, we do an informal scaling 
exercise. We first scale the estimates up by a factor of 5 to account for the entire population 
of Medicare fee for service enrollees, then adjust to account for the 28% of Medicare 
patients who enroll in a Medicare Advantage plan, and finally divide by 10 to calculate 
annual estimates. We recover a $5.5 million annual welfare loss from overuse of PE CT due 
to low testing thresholds, and a $25 million annual loss from misweighting observable 
patient risk factors, for emergency department CT scans among elderly patients. Yet these 
scaled welfare gains from the efficient application of PE CT to the elderly population 
seeking emergency care may represent only a small fraction of the total welfare benefit 
available from more efficient diagnostic testing and treatment decisions across a variety of 
medical conditions.
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8 Conclusion
While it is commonly believed that the US health care system spends significant resources 
on services that have low medical returns and high costs, there is little consensus on how this 
waste could be reduced. Wasteful spending is characterized both by overuse of medical care 
and mistargeting of medical resources. This paper investigates both forms of inefficiency, 
analyzing whether doctors efficiently select patients for medical testing and how physicians 
vary in the risk thresholds at which they test patients. We study these inefficiencies in the 
context of emergency department CT scans to diagnose pulmonary embolism (PE). We 
document both widespread variation in physician use of CT scans for PE unexplained by 
differences in patient risk, and also systemic failure to target medical testing to the highest 
risk patients.
The identification strategy underlying this analysis relies on exclusion restrictions motivated 
by our structural model of testing behavior. The identification arguments require that 
physicians select patients for testing on the basis of private information about expected PE 
risk and they apply a consistent PE risk threshold across patients. The ignorability 
assumption that private information about PE risk is independently and identically 
distributed across doctors and patients underlies the single-index structure and is important 
to identifying the model. Further, to the extent that we have not isolated marginal tested 
patients to recover test thresholds of high-volume doctors, we may be understating the full 
costs of over-testing behavior; notably, sensitivity analyses suggest our results on 
misweighting are not sensitive to the definition of marginal patients. If the value of treating 
pulmonary embolism varies substantially across patients, this may explain some of the 
apparent patterns of misweighting and overuse.
Estimating the model to study physicians’ CT scanning decisions in a national sample of 
Medicare claims, we find substantial variation in physician’s use of diagnostic scans on low-
risk patients. This variation generates a negative relationship between testing propensities 
and test yield across physicians, since physicians who test more also test lower risk patients 
on average. Investigating the role of training and practice environment in explaining practice 
styles, we find that physicians practicing in high-spending Dartmouth Atlas regions and 
those with less experience are more likely to scan low-risk patients. Other factors, such as 
hospital ownership or quality of medical school training are not significantly related to 
testing behavior. Taken as a whole, observable characteristics can explain only a small 
fraction of the total variation in testing thresholds. Applying further calibration assumptions 
suggests that 84% of physicians in our sample are overtesting on the margin in the sense that 
their risk threshold is lower than the calibrated optimum.
We also find that doctors do not weight observable patient risk factors in a way that would 
maximize test yields. Physicians systematically underweight certain important predictors of 
PE risk, including recent prior hospitalizations and metastatic cancer. Other preexisting 
conditions that have similar clinical symptoms to PE are over-weighted in the testing 
decision. These apparent errors occur despite the fact that physicians are widely encouraged 
to use diagnostic scoring systems such as the Wells or Geneva score to assess the risk of PE 
before deciding whether to order a CT scan. The continued prevalence of risk assessment 
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mistakes despite the popularity of these PE risk scoring systems may reflect shortcomings in 
the scoring systems themselves or failures to make adequate use of these scores. (The data 
used in this project cannot disentangle these possibilities.) Together, these mistakes in 
assessing patient PE risk lead to significant welfare losses from failing to target the test to 
the highest risk patients according to our welfare simulations. In fact, despite the huge 
attention in the health economics literature to the problem of overuse of care, the simulated 
welfare loss from mistargeting of diagnostic imaging is four times larger than the welfare 
loss from overuse.
The model developed in this paper could be applied to a variety of empirical contexts—it is 
applicable whenever economic actors make repeated decisions about whom to treat, as long 
as the objective function is known for the counterfactual where treated individuals are 
untreated. In the PE testing case, we know that untested individuals have no PE detected. In 
other applications, the model could be used to evaluate the decisions of loan officers to 
extend credit, hiring directors to select among potential job applicants, or admissions 
officers to predict which students will perform most highly. Positively, one could investigate 
the degree to which observed heterogeneity in treatment rates is due to decision-maker 
discretion. Normatively, many of these organizations have specific objectives they seek to 
optimize (e.g. reducing default on loans or productivity among employees) and one could 
use the model developed here to investigate whether observed selection patterns are 
successfully optimizing these outcomes.
Our findings suggest that both overuse and misuse of medical resources are important 
drivers of high spending and low medical returns to care. Future work could pair this 
framework for estimating overuse of diagnostic testing with experimental or quasi-
experimental variation in physician’s training or practice environment; these estimates could 
more directly inform policy by causally identifying how these changes to a physician’s 
education or training affect the efficiency of the medical care delivered. Given more detailed 
patient-level data, our model could be used to formulate optimal guidelines and risk scores, 
overcoming the selection problems that may lead to biased estimates of risk under popular 
existing methodologies. Our findings underscore the fact that purely cost-focused health 
reform may be insufficient to achieve efficiency in healthcare delivery—there are potentially 
large benefits to patients from physicians making better use of the available information to 
target medical resources to those patients with the highest returns.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. 
Stylized relationship between testing thresholds, testing rates, and test yields
Notes: Figure illustrates the theoretic relationship between testing thresholds, test yields and 
fraction of patients tested for two hypothetical doctors, A and B. Patients are sorted along 
the x-axis according to their risk of PE, qid, from highest risk to lowest risk. Each point (x, 
y) along the plotted curve shows the fraction of patients x for whom qid ≥ y. For example, at 
point (TA = 2/3, τA = 1/2) in Panel A, the graph indicates that 2/3 of patients have a risk of 
PE that equals or exceeds 1/2. τA denotes doctor A’s testing threshold, TA denotes the 
fraction of patients tested by doctor A, ZA denotes doctor A’s test yield (among tested 
patients), and likewise for doctor B. In Panel A, both doctors face patient populations with 
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the same distribution of PE risk. In Panel B, Doctor B’s patients are higher risk, i.e. for any 
given probability of a positive test q, a greater fraction of doctor B’s patients meet or exceed 
that threshold compared to doctor A.
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Figure 2. 
Binned scatterplot of physician test yield by fraction of patients tested
Notes: Figures displays a binned scatterplot based on our sample of Medicare claims data. 
Physicians are binned into deciles according to the fraction of patients they test. Panel A 
reports results across all patients evaluated by each doctor; the x-axis reports the average 
fraction of patients tested and the y-axis reports the rate of positive test results among tested 
patients, within each physician decile. The slope coefficient and standard error on the simple 
bivariate regression of average test yield on fraction of patients tested is reported on the 
panel. Panels B, C, and D maintain the same definitions of physician groups by deciles of 
test rate as in Panel A, but splits each doctor’s patients into groups according to whether they 
have a particular risk characteristic. We report average test rates and test yields by 
physician’s test decile, for patients with and without the listed characteristic.
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Figure 3. 
Binned scatterplot of physician test yield by testing propensity index: Estimation results and 
simulations
Notes: Figure displays a binned scatterplot based on our estimation and simulation results; 
physicians are binned into deciles based on the average estimated value of the testing 
propensity index . The open circle markers plots the relationship between physicians’ 
actual test yields and physicians’ average . Th solid square markers display the simulated 
relationship between testing propensities and test yields under a counterfactual with no 
variation in physician testing thresholds, and instead all physicians assigned the average 
testing threshold E(τd). The X-shaped markers displays the simulated relationship between 
testing propensities and test yields if there were no variation in physician testing thresholds 
and there were no misweighting of observable risk factors.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
A. Untested patients B. Patients with negative tests C. Patients with positive tests
Patient characteristics
 Age 77.6 76.8 76.9
 Female 0.586 0.602 0.600
 Black 0.082 0.066 0.083
 History of PE 0.003 0.006 0.017
Doctor, hospital and region characteristics
 Doctor experience 16.5
(8.3)
16.4
(8.4)
16.8
(8.5)
 Top 50 research med. school 0.28 0.29 0.30
 Top 50 primary med. school 0.26 0.27 0.28
 Academic hospital 0.33 0.34 0.356
 For profit hospital 0.12 0.13 0.120
 HRR avg spending (in $) 8,198
(959)
8,173
(972)
8,089
(936)
 Average income in region 22,771
(5521)
23,005
(5490)
23,039
(5710)
 Joint and several liability 0.69 0.70 0.692
 Malpractice damage caps 0.70 0.76 0.747
 Number of observations 1,819,015 66,677 4,968
Notes: Table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Data is from the Medicare claims 2000–2009, the American Hospital 
Association annual survey, the American Medical Association Masterfile, the Dartmouth Atlas, and the Avraham Database of State Tort Law 
Reform.
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Table 2
Summary statistics illustrating potential misweighting of risk factors
A. Fraction tested B. Test yield
Selected candidates for under-weighting
 Prostate cancer (CCW) 0.0370 0.1019
 No prostate cancer (CCW) 0.0380 0.0677
 Black 0.0313 0.0851
 Non-black 0.0385 0.0682
 History of PE 0.0726 0.1881
 No history of PE 0.0378 0.0686
 History of deep vein thrombosis 0.0507 0.1656
 No history of deep vein thrombosis 0.0378 0.0685
 Prior hospital visit within 30 days 0.0465 0.1976
 No prior hospital visit within 30 days 0.0377 0.0656
Selected candidates for over-weighting
 Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (CCW) 0.0466 0.0524
 No chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (CCW) 0.0360 0.0742
 Ischemic heart disease (CCW) 0.0376 0.0566
 No ischemic heart disease (CCW) 0.0382 0.0786
 Atrial fibrillation (CCW) 0.0317 0.0520
 No atrial fibrillation (CCW) 0.0388 0.0713
Notes: Table reports summary statistics for selected comorbidities to motivate the examination of misweighting. Variables are selected on the 
Column A reports average rates of testing for patients with and without the listed conditions. Column B reports average rate of positive tests among 
tested patients with and without the listed conditions. CCW notes comorbidity is coded by the Chronic Condition Warehouse. Data is from the 
Medicare claims 2000–2009.
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Table 3
Regressions of testing threshold on physician characteristics and practice environment
Dependent variable: Physician testing threshold τd
OLS FGLS OLS FGLS
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
 Doctor experience 0.0007***
(0.0001)
0.0007***
(0.0001)
0.0007***
(0.0002)
0.0008***
(0.0001)
 Top 50 research medical school 0.0047
(0.0038)
0.0050
(0.0031)
0.0053
(0.0047)
0.0032
(0.0037)
 Top 50 primary care medical school −0.0062
(0.0039)
−0.0042
(0.0032)
−0.0077
(0.0048)
−0.0030
(0.0037)
 Academic hospital 0.0006
(0.0026)
0.0007
(0.0022)
 For profit hospital −0.0004
(0.0041)
−0.0018
(0.0032)
 Log(HRR average Medicare spending)
−0.0391***
(0.0109)
−0.0474***
(0.0093)
 Average income in region (in $10k) 0.0000
(0.0025)
0.0000
(0.0019)
 Joint and several liability 0.0001
(0.0027)
0.0003
(0.0023)
 Malpractice damage caps −0.0029
(0.0028) −0.0053
**
(0.0023)
 Hospital Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Notes: Each column reports results from a regression of estimated physician testing thresholds τd on characteristics of the physician’s training and 
practice environment. Even numbered columns report FGLS estimates which account for estimation error in τd. Columns 3 and 4 include hospital 
fixed effects. An observation is an individual doctor; there are 6636 observations.
*
significant at the 10% level
**
significance at the 5% level;
***
significance at the 1% level.
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Table 4
Comorbidities with significant misweighting: Impact of comorbidity on testing decisions and estimated 
misassessment of PE risk
Marginal effect 
from testing 
eqn
(1)
Misassessment of 
PE risk
(2)
Std. error of 
misassessment
(3)
T statistic of 
misassessment
(4)
Underweighted risk factors
 Prior hospital visit w/in 30 days −0.0094 0.1070 0.0121 8.8430
 Prior hospital visit w/in 7 days −0.0041 0.1128 0.0130 8.6769
 Prostate cancer (CCW) 0.0014 0.0298 0.0048 6.2083
 Cancer metastisis (Elixhauser) −0.0155 0.0726 0.0128 5.6719
 History of deep vein thrombosis 0.0092 0.0571 0.0114 5.0088
 History of pulmonary embolism 0.0315 0.0666 0.0145 4.5931
 Rhumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis (CCW) 0.0053 0.0091 0.0024 3.7917
 Endometrial cancer (CCW) −0.0011 0.0547 0.0153 3.5752
 Obesity (Elixhauser) 0.0095 0.0218 0.0076 2.8684
 Paralysis (Elixhauser) −0.0026 0.0331 0.0117 2.8291
 Other neurological conditions (Elixhauser) −0.0043 0.0194 0.0075 2.5867
 Any prior admission history 0.0028 0.0102 0.0041 2.4878
 Alzheimer’s disease (CCW) −0.0023 0.0152 0.0064 2.3750
 Colorectal cancer (CCW) −0.0012 0.0136 0.0067 2.0299
Overweighted risk factors
 Ischemic heart disease (CCW) 0.0007 −0.0226 0.0023 −9.8261
 Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (CCW) 0.0132 −0.0182 0.0036 −5.0556
 Atrial fibrillation (CCW) −0.0066 −0.0156 0.0036 −4.3333
 Depression (Elixhauser) 0.0033 −0.0208 0.0069 −3.0145
 Peripheral vascular disease (Elixhauser) −0.0013 −0.0214 0.0071 −3.0141
 Diabetes (CCW) −0.0055 −0.0087 0.0029 −3.0000
 Osteoperosis (CCW) 0.0024 −0.0087 0.0033 −2.6364
 Deficiency anemias (Elixhauser) −0.0004 −0.0142 0.0056 −2.5357
 Asthma (CCW) 0.0043 −0.0088 0.0040 −2.2000
 Chronic pulmonary disease (Elixhauser) −0.0042 −0.0094 0.0048 −1.9583
Demographic factors
 Black −0.0074 0.0257 0.0044 5.8409
 Asian 0.0005 −0.0386 0.0118 −3.2712
 Hispanic −0.0056 −0.0168 0.0097 −1.7320
 Female 0.0014 0.0000 0.0024 0.0000
 Age 65–69 −0.0012 0.0119 0.0037 3.2162
 Age 70–74 −0.0089 0.0129 0.0052 2.4808
 Age 75–79 −0.0024 0.0140 0.0038 3.6842
 Age 80–84 −0.0033 0.0166 0.0039 4.2564
 Age 85–89 −0.0043 0.0208 0.0042 4.9524
 Age 90–94 −0.0127 0.0132 0.0078 1.6923
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Notes: This table reports results only for demographic variables and variables with statistically significant evidence of misweighting. The results 
are continued in Appendix Table A.2, which reports results for the remaining comorbidities. Column 1 reports marginal effects from coefficient 
estimates of the testing equation (i.e. equation 2); for example, patients who were admitted to the hospital within 30 days are 0.94 percentage points 
less likely to be tested, after controlling for included PE risk factors and physicians’ testing thresholds. Column 2 reports estimates of physicians’ 
misweighting of these PE risk factors estimated from equation 14; for example, physicians’ observed testing patterns suggest they are 
underestimating the PE risk associated with a prior hospital visit in the past 30 days by 10.7 percentage points. Column 3 reports standard errors on 
these misweighting terms. Column 4 reports t-statistics. Variables are sorted by statistical significance, with the exception of demographic risk 
factors.
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Table 5
Distribution of testing thresholds and misweighting under alternative estimation strategies
Baseline parametric model, all 
comorbidities
Parametric model, 
Elixhauser 
comorbidities excluded
Parametric model, 
Elixhauser 
comorbidities & 
demographics excluded
(1) (2) (3)
Mean of τd 0.0563 0.0623 0.0662
Standard deviation of τd 0.0540 0.0396 0.0394
Average absolute value of PE 
misassessment
0.0226 0.0214 0.0200
Standard deviation of PE 
misassessment
0.0347 0.0336 0.0329
Number of observations 1,890,660 1,890,660 1,890,660
Heteroskedastic parametric model Semiparametric model, 
linear polynomial
Semiparametric model, 
cubic polynomial
(4) (5) (6)
Mean of τd 0.0703 0.0672 0.0661
Standard Deviation of τd 0.0514 0.0539 0.0541
Average absolute value of PE 
misassessment
0.0212 0.0207 0.0208
Standard deviation of PE 
misassessment
0.0361 0.0357 0.0364
Number of observations 861,707 861,707 861,707
Notes: Panel 1 reports the estimated posterior mean and standard deviation of physician testing thresholds τd from our baseline parametric model, 
after applying the Bayesian shrinkage described in Appendix F. Recall that τd is the threshold probability of a positive test at which a physician 
determines it is worthwhile to test a patient. The average absolute value of misweighting calculates the absolute value of the difference between 
physicians’ assessment of the patient’s PE probability and the estimated risk associated with the patient’s comorbidities, and then averages this 
value across all patients. The standard deviation of misweighting describes how the amount of misweighting varies across patients. Panel 2 reports 
results from the parametric model that excludes all Elixhauser comorbidities. Panel 3 reports results from the parametric model that excludes both 
Elixhauser comorbidities and demographic variables. Panel 4 reports results from the heteroskedastic model described in Section 6.2, which allows 
the variance of ηid to differ across physicians. Panels 5 and 6 report results from the semiparametric model described in Section 6.3, where Panel 5 
fits the function λ(·) with a linear function and Panel 6 applies a cubic polynomial. Models estimated in Panels 4, 5, and 6 exclude Elixhauser 
comorbidities and demographic variables and are estimated on a random subsample of half of the physicians for computational tractability.
Am Econ Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 November 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Abaluck et al. Page 56
Table 6
Calibration Parameters
Definition Value Parameter Source
test sensitivity 0.83 s Stein et al., 2006
baseline false positive rate 0.04 fp Stein et al., 2006
value of a statistical life $1,000,000 VSL Murphy and Topel, 2006
medical benefit of treating PE 0.025VSL MB Lessler et al., 2009
medical cost of treating PE 0.0017VSL MC Lessler et al., 2009
financial cost of testing $300 c estimated from Medicare claims
financial cost of PE treatment $2,800 CT estimated from Medicare claims
Notes: Calibrated parameters of the model applied in welfare simulations reported in Section 7.
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Table 8
Patient welfare with observed misweighting vs. in simulations with no misweighting
False positive rate of 4%
Actual testing decisions No misweighting, simulation 
without cross validation
No misweighting, simulation 
with cross validation
(1) (2) (3)
Description of results:
 Percent of patients tested 3.8% 4.3% 4.3%
 Number of patients tested 71314 81410 79734
 Test yield among tested patients 7.0% 9.2% 8.6%
 Number of positive tests detected 5019 7526 6872
Welfare analysis:
 Total financial costs of testing ($ millions) 35.6 45.2 43.4
 Total medical cost of testing ($ millions) 8.5 12.4 11.7
 Total medical benefits of testing ($ millions) 57.5 106.8 96.7
 Net benefits of testing ($ millions) 13.5 49.1 41.6
 Total (financial + medical) costs per test ($) 618.9 707.8 690.8
 Total benefits per test ($) 806.9 1311.3 1213.1
 Net benefits per test ($) 188.1 603.5 522.2
Notes: We compare testing behavior and social welfare under the observed physician weighting of patient risk factors (in column 1) to simulated 
behavior assuming that physicians target testing to patients with the highest expected probability of a positive test based on observable 
demographics and comorbidities (in column 2). The simulated results in Panel B allow τd to follow the estimated posterior distribution (i.e. without 
correcting for overtesting).
Am Econ Rev. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2017 November 01.
